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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Problem statement 
Tensions have arisen in Kenya’s devolved system between the Senate - the body representing 
the sub-national units at the national level and the county governors.  The magnitude of the 
problem is such that it has motivated a publisher in Nairobi, to ‘capture the moment’ by way 
of a comic book. This is in a bid to fathom the nature and cause of the problem in a fun way 
for the public good, and to seek to find solutions to the volatile relations. These conflicts 
threaten to rock Kenya’s nascent devolved system. As figure 1.1 below demonstrates, there is 
almost a boxing match between the senator and governor. In such an antagonistic 
atmosphere, realising the full fruits of devolution would become a nearly impossible mission.  
 
Figure 1.1 Senator versus Governor: ‘The battle of the titans’ 
 
Source: Ronin Creatives             The Easy Times (2014), Nairobi               Caption: Author. 
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Source: Ronin Creatives              The Easy Times (2014), Nairobi. 
 
In first cartoon, the two ‘titans,’ a governor and senator, are seen in a boxing ring ready to 
take on each other. The senator is portrayed as an enraged aggressor, eager to strike, while 
the exasperated governor appears to be more on the defensive. Mr Knowings, a neutral 
character and the narrator of the comic book stands between them, ostensibly as a referee. 
The second cartoon portrays the senator in a more casual carefree manner, almost like a 
rogue, holding what could be money in his hands, perhaps an indication of the power that the 
Senate wields over the county government finances and its oversight role. The governor, on 
the other hand, is depicted as a smartly dressed, more sober individual, with documents 
tucked beneath his arms and holding what appears to be a pen in one hand, ostensibly ready 
to fulfil his executive functions. In the subsequent discussions, this depiction falls into place 
when the roles of the governor and senator are examined and the causes of the conflicts 
analysed. Similar to the Mr Knowings, this research study seeks to explore, albeit on a more 
serious note, the nature and causes of these conflicts, what the law provides concerning the 
relationship between senators and governors and how the conflicts can be avoided or 
resolved. Who, if at all, is the ‘bad guy’ here? This study sets to find out.  
Figure 1.2: Governors versus Senators-the rift. 
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The general elections held on 4 March 2013 brought to life a multi-level system of 
governance for Kenya that had been ordained by her 2010 Constitution. The Constitution of 
Kenya, 2010 (“the Constitution”) provides for ‘national’ and ‘county’ as the two levels of 
government, which are supposed to be ‘distinct’ and ‘inter-dependent’.1 Emerging from a 
centralist system of governance, the Constitution thus introduced more posts in Kenya’s 
governance and with it a new sets of relations. Key among the new developments was the 
reintroduction of the Senate as one of the two bodies constituting the bicameral Parliament of 
Kenya.
2
 There was also the introduction of 47 counties and governance structures within 
them, that is, the county executive headed by a county governor and a county assembly.
3
 
 
The Constitution designates the Senate as a representative of the counties and mandates it to, 
inter alia, ‘protect the interests of the counties and their governments’.4 The supreme law also 
bestows upon the Senate the role of ‘oversight over national revenue allocated to the county 
governments,’ thus creating a web of relations between the Senate as a body at the national 
level and the counties and county governments. Relations are also created between senators 
as individual representatives and counties and county governments.  
 
The relationship between the Senate and the governors has been on rocky ground ever since 
they assumed their respective offices, in what could pass for sibling rivalry between the two 
entities charged with advancing the interests of the county. Whether real or perceived, there 
are concerns that the Senate is overreaching its mandate with regard to the county 
governments, which has met with stiff resistance from the governors, leading to tug of wars 
between the Senate and the county executives. 
 
The role of the Senate as representative and protector of county interests and county 
governments appears to have blurred significantly, as that of oversight takes pre-eminence. 
The exercise of oversight over finances of county governments has put the county governors 
(“governors”) and the Senate at logger-heads. Court cases have been mounted challenging the 
manner and extent of the Senate’s oversight mandate over county governments.5 
Furthermore, motions and processes of removal of governors by way of impeachment by 
                                                          
1
 Art 6(2) Constitution. 
2
 Art 93 Constitution. 
3
 Arts 176-179 Constitution. 
4
 Art 96(1) Constitution. 
5
 See for instance International Legal Consultancy Group v Senate & Clerk of the Senate [2014] eKLR 
(“International Legal Consultancy”).  
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county assemblies and the Senate have elicited even more contention than consensus. At the 
time of concluding the present study, one governor had been impeached ‘twice’, and the 
Senate had presided over impeachment proceedings in three other matters involving two 
governors and two deputy governors, and a few more threats were in the offing. This was 
amidst allegations of greed, political motives and ill will behind the impeachment processes 
by the Senate and the county assemblies involved. This suggests that the well-intended 
powers of oversight granted to the Senate may be being  invoked for purposes other than that 
originally envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, including the advancement of selfish 
personal and political ends. 
 
With regard to relations between senators and their respective counties, there have been 
concerns regarding their level of involvement in the affairs of county governments, especially 
in county development. There has been an outcry that senators are keen on usurping the 
executive role of the governors by approving laws that make them chairs of development 
forums at the county level, much to the chagrin of the governors. This has further heightened 
tensions with the county governments feeling ‘invaded’ in ‘their own territories’. At the time 
of writing, the County Governments (Amendment) Act, 2014
6
, an Act of Parliament 
introducing County Development Boards in counties, and which designated senators as 
chairpersons, had been enacted into law. In fact, a petition challenging the constitutionality of 
the Act
7
 and another impugning the Constituencies Development Fund Act, 2013
8
 were 
ongoing in the High Court at the time of concluding this study. The inclusion of senators in 
the planning and co-ordination of development projects in counties not only raises serious 
constitutional questions on functional division of powers across the devolved structure, but 
sets governors in a collision path with senators as regards division of functions and 
responsibilities. Valid legal concerns as to who is supposed to do what and to what extent 
have emerged. 
 
This state of affairs demands careful examination of the functional division of powers 
between the two levels of government and the relations between the Senate and the county 
governments in order to better understand how the Constitution envisages the conduct of 
                                                          
6
 County Governments (Amendment) Act No 14 of 2014.  
7
 Council of County Governors v The Senate & another Nairobi Petition No 413 of 2014.  
8
 Institute for Social Accountability & another v The National Assembly  & 3 others Nairobi Petition No 71 of 
2013. 
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these relations, and what the possible triggers of conflicts are, so that a clear path for fruitful 
future interactions can be charted.  
 
Devolution is a fundamental principle of the Constitution and is central to steering the 
country’s social, economic and political growth.9 The devolved system was a ‘dream come 
true’ for many Kenyan people and they have high expectations. Since the governance system 
‘generated such high hopes among Kenyans’, it is ‘imperative that it does not disappoint’.10 
The manner in which the national and county governments relate will shape the course of the 
devolved system and inform both the success or otherwise of devolution in Kenya. More 
particularly, the manner in which the Senate-county relations play out will ultimately impact 
the effectiveness of county governments and governance generally.  
 
2. Research question 
In addressing the above problem, this study aims to answer the following broad question: 
What is the law and practice with regard to the roles and relationship between the Senate and 
county governments in Kenya and how can the work relations between governors and the 
senators/Senate be fostered? In particular, the study addresses itself to the following 
questions: 
i. What is the constitutional framework and established norms with regard to the 
relationship between the Senate and the counties? 
ii. Is there clear role definition for the Senate, the senator and the county governments in 
the Constitution and the law?  
iii. What is the emerging practice relating to the discharge of the respective roles of the 
Senate and county governments in Kenya? 
iv. What are the triggers of conflicts between the Senate and county governments? 
v. What are some of the possible solutions to these conflicts?  
 
3. Argument 
The principal strand of argument running through this study is that the conflicts pitting the 
Senate and the county governments against each other are partly attributable to inherent 
weaknesses in the design of Kenya’s devolved structure. However, other exogenous factors, 
such as politics and power strife have played a major role in triggering and exacerbating the 
                                                          
9
 Speaker of the Senate & another v Hon. Attorney-General & another & 3 others [2013] eKLR para 195. 
10
 Word Bank Devolution without disruption: Pathways to a successful new Kenya (2012): (iii).  
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conflicts. It is nevertheless the argument of the study that, despite some of the inherent 
weaknesses in the system, most, if not all, the conflicts can be avoided by respecting the 
constitutional division of powers and functions between the various organs of government 
and by upholding the devolution principles. It is also submitted that some adjustments to the 
existing law could play a role in solving part of the problem. 
 
4. Literature Survey 
Much has been said and written about Kenya’s devolved system under the Constitution. 
However, nearly all of the available literature was written prior to the first elections under the 
Constitution which ushered in the new office bearers in the various devolved structures. 
Hence, the material does not address the practical challenges arising after the county 
governments took office. 
 
There is abundant literature tracing Kenya’s long-winded and slippery road from pre-
independence times to the current devolved system.
11
 Writing on devolution under the 2010 
Constitution, Nyanjom delves into the implication of devolution on certain aspects including 
service delivery,
12
 while Sihanya explores the challenges and prospects of implementing the 
Constitution and the role of various agencies in the implementation process.
13
 Ghai and 
Cottrell
14
 unpackage the constitutional provisions in an easily digestible form for ordinary 
citizens and underline the citizen’s role in achieving the much desired change that the 
Constitution promises.  
 
The World Bank has released two reports focused on Kenya’s devolution: The Special 
Focus: Kenya’s Momentous Devolution report reviews the promise of devolution in Kenya, 
while outlining steps needed to deliver it. It depicts the significance of fiscal responsibility, 
the public service and the transition arrangements to the success of devolution. The 
                                                          
11
 For details on the politics and debates surrounding early devolution in ‘pre’ and ‘post’ independence period, 
see Maxon RM Kenya’s Independence Constitution: Constitution-making and end of empire (2011) and Ghai 
YP & McAuslan JPWB Public law and political change in Kenya: A study of the legal framework of 
government from colonial times to the present (1970). See also Ghai YP ‘Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan 
state’ (2008) 2 Journal of Eastern African Studies 211-226, Bosire CM Devolution for Development, Conflict 
Resolution, and Limiting Central Power: An analysis of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of the Western Cape (2013)): 83-200. 
12
 Nyanjom O ‘Devolution in Kenya’s new Constitution’ (2011) Society for International Development (SID) 
Constitution Working Paper No 8.  
13
 Sihanya B ‘Constitutional implementation in Kenya, 2010-2015: Challenges and prospects’ (2011) FES 
Kenya Occassional Paper No 5 
14
 Ghai YP & Cottrell G Kenya’s Constitution: An Instrument for Change (2011). 
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subsequent report, entitled Devolution without Disruption: Pathways to a successful new 
Kenya, recognised that there would be enormous challenges in the implementation of the 
devolved system but was optimistic that Kenyans would find their own solutions as the 
problems arose.
15
 The report notes that Kenya embraced a highly complex transition 
mechanism but that ‘the potential payoffs [were] commensurately high’.16 The report also 
emphasised the need for a smooth and gradual transition.
17
 
 
Closely related to the subject under study is the contribution by Kirui and Murkomen
18
, 
which traces Kenya’s parliamentary system from the pre-independence period through the 
various phases to the 2010 Constitution. The paper identifies various structural weaknesses 
with the current parliamentary system. The authors note that the strength of the Senate is 
dependent on the strength of the county governments and are of the view that Kenya adopted 
a weak system of devolved units and that this limited and continues to limit the scope of the 
Senate’s work.19 
 
Pertinent to the discussions in the present study is Bosire’s contribution, which assesses 
whether and how the Constitution’s design features are suited to serve development, conflict 
resolution and limitation on central power; the three ultimate objects of devolution.
20
 Of 
particular interest to this study is the authors’ exposition on functional competencies of the 
various organs within the devolved structure and, particularly, how some design aspects are 
likely to impact on the Senate’s role vis-à-vis the county governments. 
 
 A scan of the available literature reveals that, whereas there is a wealth of information on 
devolution and the Constitution generally, there is limited academic material on Kenya’s 
devolution under the new constitutional dispensation. Even the scarce literature sources 
available post the 2010 Constitution, were written prior to the first elections under the 
devolved system and centre on what should or should not be done or expected in the 
implementation process. Practical matters arising after the county governments took office 
were not catered for. More so, there is no literature to date addressing emerging conflicts 
                                                          
15
 World Bank (2012): (iii).  
16
 Word Bank (2012): xxvii. 
17
 World Bank (2012): 51. 
18
 Kirui K & Murkomen K ‘The Legislature: Bi-Cameralism under the new Constitution’ (2011) Society for 
International Development (SID) Constitution Working Paper No 8.  
19
 Kirui & Murkomen (2011): 19. 
20
 See generally Bosire (2013). 
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between the various organs in the devolved system. This study seeks to address the 
knowledge gaps on the nature and extent of functions and relations between the Senate and 
the county government that have arisen since the devolution of powers as per the 
Constitution. 
 
5. Structure 
The study is organised into five chapters, including this chapter. Chapter Two provides an 
overview of Kenya’s devolved system. It briefly traces key landmarks towards the present 
devolution in Kenya and examines the institutional structure of Kenya’s devolved system 
with a focus on the Senate and county governments. The chapter also highlights relations and 
the respective powers and functional competencies between the two levels of government. 
More focus is given to the role of governors, county assembly and the senate.  
 
Chapter Three forms the bulk of the study, providing an in-depth assessment of the role of the 
Senate in relation to counties and county governments. In this respect, the chapter centres its 
discussion on the role of the Senate in representation of county interests and the oversight and 
impeachment roles. The constitutional backing, normative principles and the practice flowing 
from each of these roles are interrogated and the Court’s resolution of the emerging conflicts 
is highlighted. The design weaknesses appurtenant to these roles are also identified and 
systematically considered. 
 
Chapter Four examines the relations between the Senator and county governments. Of 
particular focus is the extent to which the Senator can lawfully participate in the affairs of the 
county and its county government. In this regard, more attention is given to the role of the 
Senator in development projects and planning.  
 
Finally, chapter Five recaps the major findings of the research and distils the lessons learnt. It 
also makes recommendations on possible solutions to the study problem. 
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6. Research Methodology 
The research was primarily a desk top study in which the relevant primary and secondary 
material, including law journal articles, books, case law and other relevant materials were 
critically examined. Throughout the study, the author used real case studies in Kenya as 
applicable to the various subtopics and drew relevant lessons from other jurisdictions with 
similar systems. In discussing the role of the Senate and senators and their interactions with 
county governments, the Constitution and relevant legislation were used as the primary 
reference material. This was supplemented by relevant literature and case law. In order to 
obtain hard facts regarding how the constitutional roles have played out in practice, the 
author relied on news articles, case law, Acts of Parliament, proposed laws,  parliamentary 
Hansards and the author’s own perception.  
 
For comparative analysis on the role of the Senate and relations between county governments 
and the Senate, a comparison is made with other jurisdictions with varying forms of 
bicameral representation such as South Africa’s National Council of Provinces (NCOP), the 
Nigerian and US Senates, and the German Bundesrat amongst others. In so doing, the 
respective constitutions of the relevant countries, available literature and the internet form 
useful resources. Lastly, lessons and recommendations were drawn based on the findings of 
the study anchored on the Constitution and established norms from other jurisdictions. 
Relevant literature was also considered and ultimately the author’s own idea of how the 
problem can be addressed is put forth. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Architecture of Kenya’s Devolved Government 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The road to Kenya’s present devolved system was long-winded, bumpy and slippery, marked 
by many missed chances. Settling for a devolved system of governance was not by accident. 
It was intended to be a panacea to the effects of an overly centralist state and the 
discriminatory practices that the country had hitherto endured in her pre-independence and 
post-independence periods. During the constitutional review process, many lengthy debates 
dominated the proposed new model of governance.  
 
This chapter begins by providing a brief background to Kenya’s current devolved system, 
highlighting some of the key landmarks in the country’s transition from a centralised state. It 
also provides a glimpse at some of the discussions during the constitutional review process 
involving the devolved structures. The chapter then proceeds to present an overview of 
Kenya’s devolution, unpacking the institutional structures constituting the national and 
county governments, their relationship and power sharing. The powers and functions of 
county governors, county assemblies and the Senate are particularly highlighted as they are 
integral to the problem under investigation in subsequent chapters. From this chapter, the 
vertical as well as horizontal division of powers in the devolved structure will become clear, 
as will the relationship between the two levels of government. 
 
2.2 From centralist to decentralised State 
Devolution efforts in Kenya predate the country’s independence in 1963.21 The colonial 
period was characterised by executive dominance of the then Governor and the Colonial 
Office with laws that further asserted this dominance through executive supremacy.
22
 The 
Governor ‘was president of both the Executive and the Legislative Council and was 
                                                          
21
 For a detailed account of the historical background of Kenya’s journey from the colonial period to the current 
devolved system, see Bosire (2013):83-200 and Ghai YP & McAuslan JPWB (1970) Public law and political 
change in Kenya: A study of the legal framework of government from colonial times to the present Oxford 
University Press. See also Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, The final report of the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission (February 2005); hereafter “CKRC (2005)”: 18-245-258 and Committee of Experts , 
The Final Report of the Committee of Experts on constitutional review (October 2010); hereafter (“CoE (2010)”: 
17-34. 
22
 Ghai YP ‘Constitutions and the Political Order in East Africa’ 21 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 403-34: 409. 
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supported by a powerful administrative system, namely, the provincial administration’.23 
Africans were discriminated against in governance and it was not until 1944 that an African 
was nominated to the Legislative Council. In development, colonial policies were 
discriminatory as well, favouring whites at the expense of the black Africans who provided 
cheap labour. This ‘divided the country along racial and ethnic lines’ and ‘impoverished large 
sections of the population’.24 Following negotiations amongst Kenyan political parties25 and 
the British Government, a devolved system was put in place, consisting of regions and a 
bicameral legislature under the 1963 Independence Constitution (“Independence 
Constitution”).  
 
2.2.1 Parliamentary system and early encounter with bicameralism 
The Independence Constitution, also popularly known as the majimbo Constitution, ushered 
in a strictly parliamentary system, complete with a bicameral Parliament, a Prime Minister 
and Cabinet drawn from Parliament.
26
 There were seven regions.
27
 The executive authority 
was vested in the Queen of England and exercised on her behalf by the Governor-General.
28
 
The Governor-General appointed a Prime Minister from among the members of the House of 
Representatives. The Prime Minister and other ministers constituted the Cabinet.
29
 
 
The National Assembly comprised the Senate and the House of Representatives; the upper 
and lower House respectively.
30
 The National Assembly and Her Majesty the Queen together 
formed Parliament.
31
 There were 41 senators, each representing the 40 colonial 
administrative districts and the Nairobi area.
32
 The Senators had a fixed tenure of six years.
33
 
The Senate was considered important in representing the smaller tribes against domination by 
                                                          
23
 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of Local Government, ‘Final Report of the Taskforce on 
Devolved Government: A Report on the Implementation of Devolved Government in Kenya’ (undated) 
hereafter the Task Force on Devolved Governance report (“TFDG report”): 11. 
24
 TFDG report: 11-2. 
25
 This was ‘a compromise between the centralist KANU and the federalist KADU’ (TFDG: 12). 
26
 CoE (2010): 18. 
27
 S 91 Independence Constitution. 
28
 S 31 Independence Constitution. 
29
 CKRC: 191. 
30
 S 34(2) Independence Constitution. See also Ghai & McAuslan (1970): 178. ‘Majimbo’ is Kiswahili word for 
‘regionalism’. 
31
 S 34(1) Independence Constitution. The Governor-General was the representative of the Queen. 
32
 S 36 Independence Constitution: 391 & Bosire (2013): 106-7. 
33
 See CKRC (2005): 23-7. The fixed period meant that changes in the mood of the electorate did not spill over 
to the composition of the Senate which would ensure the House was unshackled by party politics (Proctor 
(1965): 394)). 
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the larger ones.
34
 A second chamber was also necessary, ‘to safeguard the autonomy of the 
regions and to assure sufficient representation of minority interests at the center’.35 Proctor 
notes the weakness of the then Senate, remarking that, although ‘the Senate retained the 
power to prevent assaults on constitutionally defined minority rights, its capacity to defend 
the substance of the regional system itself was severely reduced’.36 
 
2.2.2 Back to centralism 
True to Proctor’s earlier prediction,37 a battery of subsequent amendments, beginning with 
the first constitutional amendment of 1964
38
 gradually dealt majimboism (regionalism) a fatal 
blow.
39
 An amendment two years later saw the demolition of the bicameral National 
Assembly and in its place a unicameral House was established.
40
 The cumulative effect of 
these amendments was to consolidate power in the presidency, thus undermining democracy 
and eroding the principle of checks and balances. This effectively opened the floodgates for 
abuse and misuse of power. 
41
 
 
In the meantime, the Provincial Administration established in the pre-colonial period 
continued to take root and became a channel through which the central government’s 
development policies were strategically permeated at the local level. The local authorities 
were disempowered through domination of the central government and Provincial 
Administration and were starved of revenue.
42
 Other decentralised schemes and funds would 
soon be established, beginning with the adoption of the District Focus for Rural Development 
(DFRD) in 1983. Others, such as the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), Free Primary 
Education Fund (FPE), Constituency Education Bursary Fund (CEBF), the Rural 
Electrification Programme Levy Fund (REPLF) and the Roads Maintenance Levy Fund 
(RMLF) followed suit in later years. 
                                                          
34
 The larger tribes were mainly the Kikuyu and Luo.  
35
 Proctor JH The role of the senate in the Kenya political system (1965): 390, Kirui & Murkomen (2011): 4. 
36
 Proctor (1965): 396. 
37
 Proctor (1965): 415. Proctor had warned that, ‘it must not be concluded that the future of the Senate is now 
completely assured. If the single party can be tightly controlled, the second chamber can be liquidated by 
amendment of the Constitution’.  
38
 Act No 28 of 1964. 
39
 CKRC (2005): 27, 191. Through this amendment, the President played the dual role as the head of state and 
head of government as well as a full member of the National Assembly. 
40
 Act No 40 of 1966. For more details regarding the subsequent amendments to the Independent Constitution 
and move from parliamentary to a centralist presidential state, see Ghai & McAuslan (1970):176-250, CKRC 
The Final Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (2005): 27-32, CoE (2010):18-9 and  Bosire 
(2013): 111-3. 
41
 CKRC (2005): 192, CoE (2010): 18. 
42
 Bosire (2013): 109-110, 121-9. 
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Similar to the colonial period, the centralist independent state perpetuated abuse of power, 
favouritism and the marginalisation of some areas through imbalanced development. Political 
patronage had taken root and gains were largely shared among a chosen few - the political 
elite. An elective or appointive post thus became a ticket to amassing personal wealth.
43
 
Following decades of ‘personalised’ political power, coupled with a skewed distribution of 
resources, it was evident that a different model of governance was needed; one that would 
diffuse the overly centralised political power to the grassroots so that each Kenyan, regardless 
of tribal or political affiliations got a share of the national cake and participated in 
governance. Many were optimistic that a new mode of governance ‘would improve their 
social, political and economic lives’.44 Devolution of power was thus sought, as it was hoped 
it would promote social and economic development, and ensure equitable sharing of 
resources, while protecting and promoting the interests of minorities and marginalised 
communities.
45
 
 
Re-introduction of a multiparty system through repeal of section 2A of the Constitution in 
1992 following relentless political pressure brought with it a deeper thirst for more 
meaningful constitutional reforms.
46
 It would soon become clear that a constitutional 
overhaul would be inevitable in order for fully-fledged democratic governance to take root.
47
 
The enactment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act in 1997
48
 and the appointment of the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) members in 2000 set the momentum for 
more comprehensive constitutional reforms. After a massive program of civic education and 
a collection of public views, CKRC had its first draft constitution published in September 
2002. The process was given further impetus with the coming into power of a new 
government in 2003, formed under President Kibaki, which had promised a constitution 
within its first 100 days in power.  
 
                                                          
43
 See TFDG report: 13-4. Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965, the country’s first blue print perpetuated the skewed 
developmental efforts. The policy favoured ‘high potential areas’ to the ‘low potential’ ones. 
44
 CKRC (2005): 65.   
45
 See Art 174 Constitution on objects of devolution. 
46
 CoE (2010): 19. 
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 CoE (2010): 25. 
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The National Constitutional Conference was reconvened and a second draft, known as Bomas 
Draft was adopted in 2004.
49
 However, following a constitutional challenge to the review 
process,
50
 the Bomas Draft was succeeded by another draft constitution known as the Wako 
Draft, which was rejected by the Kenyan people in a referendum carried out on 21 November 
2005. The 2007/2008 post-elections violence following the disputed presidential polls would 
jolt the country back to the constitutional-making process. As the Committee of Experts on 
the constitutional review (CoE) notes, this presented Kenya with ‘a constitutional moment, an 
opportunity to reinvigorate the stalled constitutional process.’51 There was no turning back 
and the constitutional review process gained further momentum with the establishment of the 
CoE as a review organ under the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008.
52
 The CoE had the 
mandate to, inter alia, ‘identify and resolve outstanding issues before preparing a draft 
Constitution for adoption by Parliament and ratification in a national referendum’.53 
Henceforth, the constitution-making process progressed apace and the resultant Proposed 
Draft Constitution was later endorsed by the people of Kenya in a referendum conducted on 4 
August 2010, ushering in the present devolved system of governance. The Constitution took 
effect following the promulgation of the Constitution by the President on 27 August 2010. 
 
2.2.3 Discussions on the devolution structure during the review process 
The question as to what system of government Kenya would adopt at the national level 
remained one of the most controversial issues that successive drafters of the Constitution had 
to mull over, and one of the key issues flagged as contentious by the constitutional experts.
54
 
On the one end was a purely presidential system and at the other end of the spectrum was a 
pure parliamentary system. In between was a model blending elements from both systems. 
Each system had its own pros and cons and Kenya had had a bitter taste of both, at 
independence under the majimbo Constitution and post-independence era. The CKRC had 
warned that a purely presidential system, in which all power was vested in the President, was 
‘unlikely to assist in overcoming the culture of authoritarianism’.55 In light of the country’s 
                                                          
49
 The CKRC’s assignment culminated in a draft Constitution ‘Draft Constitution of Kenya, 2004’ (popularly 
known as the Bomas Draft). The draft was endorsed by the National Constitution Conference at a location 
known as ‘Bomas of Kenya’ hence the name Bomas Draft.  
50
 Timothy Njoya and others v the Hon. Attorney-General & others, Miscellaneous Civil Application No 82 of 
2004. 
51
 CoE (2010): 22. 
52
 Act No 9 of 2008.  
53
 CoE (2010): 22.  
54
 CoE (2010): 62. The other two contentious issues were devolution and transitional clauses. 
55
 CKRC (2005): 195. 
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history, an omnipotent presidency was bound to, ‘retard the effective separation of powers 
and the system of checks and balances or a better distribution of power’. It was also feared 
that such an option would foster ethnic politics in addition to personalising state power.
56
 A 
parliamentary system in its pure form was equally undesirable as it was prone to instability, 
owing to ‘intrigues of parliamentary politics and the possibility of motions of no confidence’. 
Kenya finally settled on a presidential system, but with ‘appropriate checks and balances to 
ensure a sound democratic presidential system of governance for the people of Kenya’.57 
 
Many Kenyans expressed a wish for a bicameral legislature during the constitutional review 
process.
58
 The debate centred on the size, the mode of election for members of the Houses 
and the sharing of roles between the Houses.
59
 The issue of linkage between the second 
Chamber and the devolved units also dominated the debates.
60
 Also confronting the 
constitutional drafters was the question of hierarchy between the Houses. The CoE, in 
disapproving the Parliamentary Select Committee’s draft that designated the senate as the 
“lower” House, recommended that the Constitution, ‘should abide by modern principles of 
constitutional design and not create a hierarchy between the two houses of Parliament’.61 
Terming the tagging of the Senate as the ‘lower’ house ‘a constitutional absurdity’, the CoE 
observed that even in jurisdictions where there is a hierarchy in the Houses of Parliament, the 
Senate was not the lower house. 
 
The process leading to the choice of the 47 counties as the basic units of the subnational 
government was not devoid of controversy either. There were proposals that the then existing 
districts or constituencies be used, while others proposed a clustering of the constituencies or 
districts and yet others favoured using the Bomas regions and districts.
62
 There was a need to 
have structures that were sufficiently sizeable, so as to counteract the exercise of national 
power, while at the same time providing services proximately to the grass roots. There was 
also the cost implication and the need to avoid a replication of roles. The prolific number of 
over 250 administrative districts existing at the time hence failed this criterion and was 
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 See CKRC (2005): 191, CoE (2010): 65. 
60
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dismissed as unviable for the devolution structure.
63
 Furthermore, the legality of the majority 
of the districts had come under question and, in a High Court decision, 210 districts were 
declared as illegally created.
64
 Kenya thus resorted to the 46 districts originally created in 
1992 under the Districts and Provinces Act, 1992
65
, adding Nairobi to make 47.  
 
2.3 Devolved structure under the 2010 Constitution 
The Constitution vests all sovereign power in the people of Kenya.
66
 This sovereign power is 
exercisable at two levels of government; the national and the county. Each of these levels has 
its own legislative and executive organs. All the elections are conducted on the same day for 
the positions of President, Senator, Member of National Assembly, woman county 
representative to the National Assembly, governor and county assembly seats.
 67
  
 
2.3.1 National government 
At the national level, the President, the Deputy President and the rest of the Cabinet exercise 
executive authority
68
. The President is directly elected by popular vote in a general election 
of Members of Parliament. Cabinet secretaries are nominated and appointed by the President 
upon approval by the National Assembly.
69
 The national legislative authority rests on a 
bicameral Parliament consisting of a Senate and National Assembly.
70
 The National 
Assembly comprises representatives directly elected from each of the 290 constituencies 
across the country. A county thus encompasses a number of constituencies. In addition to the 
290 seats, there are 47 women directly elected from each of the counties and 12 others 
nominated proportionally by political parties. The speaker is an ex-officio member of the 
House.
71
 
 
The Senate comprises 68 members, including the speaker. There are 47 directly elected 
senators, each county constituting a single member constituency. There are an additional 20 
                                                          
63
 CoE (2010): 70-1, 91. 
64
 See Job Nyasimi Momanyi & 2 others v Attorney-General & another [2009] eKLR. See also Okemwa N 
‘Why High Court nullified creation of new districts.’ Daily Nation 21 September 2009 and Nyasato R ‘High 
Court outlaws 210 districts created by Moi and Kibaki since 1992’ Standard digital Saturday 5 September 2009.  
65
 Act No 11 of 1992. 
66
 Art 1(1), (2) Constitution. 
67
 See Arts 101(1), 136(2)(a), 177(1)(a) and 180(1) Constitution. 
68
 Arts 130 (1), 131(1)(b) Constitution. 
69
 Art 152 (2) (3) Constitution. 
70
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nominated senators who represent the women, youth and persons with disabilities.
72
 Of these, 
16 seats go to women nominated by political parties according to their proportional 
representation of the elected members in the senate,
73
 and two members representing the 
youth and the other two persons with disabilities.
74
 The speaker, who is elected by the 
senators from among persons who are not members of the House, is an ex officio member and 
has no vote.
75
 There is also a deputy speaker elected by the Senate from amongst 
themselves.
76
 Notably, the nominated senators have no individual vote in matters concerning 
counties since, in such cases, counties vote as a delegation. The next chapter will examine the 
implication of the delegate voting on the Senate’s role. 
 
2.3.2 County government 
There are 47 counties, each of which has its own government.
77
 A county government is 
made up of a county executive and a county assembly.
78
 The executive authority of a county 
is vested collectively in a county executive committee (CEC) which comprises a governor, a 
deputy governor and members appointed outside the county assembly by the governor but 
with the approval of the county assembly.
79
 The deputy governor is the governor’s running 
mate in the elections.
80
 These form what could loosely be termed a ‘county cabinet.’ The size 
of the CEC is dependent on the size of a county assembly.
81
 CEC members are accountable to 
the governor in the performance of their functions.
82
 
 
The governor and deputy governor are both restricted to two terms of office.
83
 A governor 
may be removed from office through the process of impeachment by initiated in the county 
assembly and sealed in the Senate under any of the grounds stipulated under the 
Constitution.
84
 The subsequent chapter shall explore how the impeachment process, both in 
its design and manner of application has contributed to the strained relations between the 
Senate and the county governments. 
                                                          
72
 Art 98(1)(a) Constitution.  
73
 Art 98(1)(b) Constitution.  
74
 Art 98(1)(c)(d) Constitution. 
75
 Arts 122(2)(a), Art 98(1)(e) and 106(1)(a) Constitution. 
76
 Art 106(1)(b) Constitution. 
77
 Art 6(1), First Schedule Constitution. 
78
 Art 176(1) Constitution. 
79
 Art 179 Constitution. 
80
 Art 180(5)(6) Constitution. 
81
 Art 179(2) Constitution. See section 35 CGA for provisions guiding appointments of members of the CEC. 
82
 Art 179(6) Constitution and ss 31(a), 39 and 40 CGA. 
83
 Art 180(7) Constitution. 
84
 Art 181(1) Constitution & s 7(1)(a) County Governments Act No 17 of 2012. 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
A county assembly is a county’s legislative body and largely consists of members directly 
elected by the registered voters of the wards, each ward constituting a single member 
constituency. There are in addition an unspecified number of special seats meant to ensure 
that no more than two thirds of the members of the county assembly are of the same gender. 
The third category of representation is that of marginalised groups, which includes persons 
with disabilities and the youth, who are nominated by political parties in proportion to the 
seats received in that election in the county.
85
 Figure 2.3 below represents a sketch of 
Kenya’s devolved system. 
 
Figure 2.3: Kenya’s devolved structure 
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2.3.3 Vertical division of powers and functions 
How does the Constitution share out power between the county and national governments? 
The respective functional competencies of the national and county governments are provided 
under Article 186 of the Constitution as read with the Fourth Schedule.  Counties have both 
executive and legislative powers over the functions allocated to them under the Fourth 
Schedule.
86
 County governments may also have additional powers through assignment by the 
national government.
87
 Additionally, powers may be transferred from one level of 
government to the other through agreement.
88
 Furthermore, county governments may enter 
into a horizontal arrangement with each other where they agree on performance of a 
particular function.
89
A function or power not assigned by the Constitution or law to a county 
belongs to the national government.
90
 Under Chapter Five of the Constitution, county 
government has power over public and community lands, which they hold in trust for the 
communities.
91
 Other powers include participating in constitutional amendments through the 
popular initiative
92
 and establishing their own public service and staff in accordance with 
Article 235 of the Constitution. Additionally, county governments have power over local 
government falling within their respective counties.
93
 The law also states that a county 
government has ‘all powers necessary for the discharge of its functions’.94  
 
It is worth mentioning here that the Constitution demands that every county government 
decentralises ‘its functions and the provision of its services to the extent that it is efficient and 
practicable to do so’.95  Part VI of the County Governments Act, 2012(CGA) provides for the 
decentralised units. 
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2.3.4 Financial relationship 
It is a core principle of Kenya’s devolution that county governments have reliable sources of 
revenue to enable them to effectively govern and deliver services.
96
 The Constitution 
provides for equitable sharing of national revenue between the county and national 
governments.
97
 The county’s equitable share must be at least fifteen percent of all revenue 
collected by national government.
98
 Article 203 provides the criteria to be followed in 
determining the equitable share. The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) makes 
recommendations on the equitable sharing of revenue raised by the national government both 
vertically and horizontally among counties.
99
 In addition to the equitable share, county 
governments may also receive additional revenue in the form of conditional or unconditional 
grants.
100
An equalisation fund amounting to 0.5 percent of all national revenue is set aside for 
provision of basic services to marginalised areas.
101
 With regard to revenue-raising powers, 
national government has the power to impose all the major taxes, that is, income tax, value-
added tax, customs duties and excise tax. On the other hand, the counties may impose 
property rates, entertainment taxes and any other tax authorised by an Act of Parliament.
102
 
Both governments may impose charges for the services they render. In terms of loans, a 
county government may only borrow with the approval of its county government’s 
assembly
103
 and if the national government guarantees the loan.  County governments are 
required to operate financial management systems that comply with national legislation. The 
Public Financial Management Act, 2012 (PFMA) provides for specific roles of county 
governments with regard to the financial management and budget process.  
 
2.3.5 Supervision 
Although the Kenyan Constitution deliberately eschews the express use of the term 
‘supervision’ unlike the case with, say, the South African one,104 it nevertheless provides for 
instances through which the national government may exercise supervisory authority over 
county governments. For instance, Parliament is mandated to enact laws to provide for 
national government’s intervention if a county government fails to perform its functions, or 
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fails to operate a financial management system in line with national legislation. Intervention 
has been applied in other jurisdictions, for instance in South Africa, where the national 
government is empowered to intervene in provincial governments and provincial 
governments in municipalities under a strict set of circumstances.
105
 The Constitution of 
Kenya also allows the President to suspend a county government under ‘exceptional 
circumstances’.106 The procedure for suspension of a county government is provided under 
Part XIII of the CGA. Furthermore, the Cabinet secretary in charge of finance may stop the 
transfer of funds to a state organ or entity, including a county government.
107
 
 
2.3.6 Intergovernmental relations 
Though distinct, the two levels of government must work in harmony in order to govern 
effectively.
108
 The Constitution requires both horizontal and vertical co-operation. Co-
operation denotes equality of the two levels of government.
109
 The spirit of co-operation also 
requires each level of government to perform its functions in a manner that respects the 
functional and institutional integrity of government at the other level.
110
 Parliament is under a 
constitutional obligation to ensure that county governments have adequate support for the 
performance of their functions through legislation.
111
 Both governments are required to 
‘assist, support and consult and, as appropriate, implement the legislation of the other level of 
government’ and ‘liaise with government at the other level for the purpose of exchanging 
information, coordinating policies and administration and enhancing capacity’.112 
Additionally, the governments must make every reasonable effort to resettle disputes 
amicably. Adversarial litigation must be avoided and other alternative forms of dispute 
resolution are encouraged before any recourse to the courts.
113
 The Intergovernmental 
Relations Act (IGRA), 2012 establishes various intergovernmental relations structures.
114
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2.4 Functions and powers of county government and the Senate 
2.4.1 Functions and powers of a governor 
The functions and powers of a governor are underpinned both in the Constitution and 
ordinary legislation. In terms of the Constitution, a governor is the chief executive of a 
county.
115
 As part of the CEC, a governor is tasked with implementing county legislation, 
managing and coordinating ‘the functions of county administration and its departments’.116As 
noted earlier, a governor also appoints the CEC members and may dismiss them from office. 
A governor as part of CEC may also prepare a draft law for consideration by the county 
assembly.
117
 In terms of accountability, the governor is obliged to furnish the county 
assembly with ‘full and regular reports on matters relating to the county’.118 
 
The statutory functions of a governor are primarily provided under the CGA. A governor has 
power to consider and assent to bills passed by the county assembly and also chair CEC 
meetings.
119
 The governor is also empowered to appoint accounting officers for departments, 
entities or decentralised units of the county government. The CGA further requires the 
governor to sign and cause to be published in the county gazette all formal decisions made by 
the governor or by the CEC.  
 
As part of checks and balances, CGA requires the governor to submit county plans and 
policies to the county assembly for approval.
120
The CGA also requires the governor to be 
accountable for the management and use of the county resources. Thus, a governor is duty-
bound to ‘submit to the county assembly an annual report on the implementation status of the 
county policies and plans’.121 The governor also performs ceremonial roles, including 
representing the county in national and international events and delivering an annual State of 
The County address.
122
 The CGA also enjoins a governor to perform ‘such State functions 
within the county as the President may from time to time assign on the basis of mutual 
consultations’. The nature and extent of this role appears ambiguous. Under the Urban Areas 
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and Cities Act, 2011,
123
 a governor is in charge of the members of municipal boards or cities 
and may dismiss a member from office.
124
 
 
Moreover, it is the responsibility of a governor to provide leadership in the county’s 
governance and development and promote county competitiveness. Generally, the governor 
must promote the principles of democracy, good governance, unity and cohesion within the 
county and facilitate citizen participation in the development of county policies and the 
delivery of services.
125
 
 
2.4.2 Functions and powers of the county assembly 
A county assembly is the legislative body of a county government.
126
 In addition to making 
laws, the county assembly has oversight powers over CEC members and other county 
executive organs.
127
 According to the CGA, a county assembly may, by a resolution, require 
the governor to dismiss a CEC member from office.
128
 This provision has however recently 
been declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution.
129
 A county assembly also has the 
power to initiate a motion of impeachment against a governor.
130
As will be seen in Chapter 
Three, the exercise of this power has been a major source of tension between the county 
assembly and governors, as much as between the Senate and governors. A county assembly 
also vets and approves nominees for appointment to county public offices. Part IV of the 
Public Financial Management Act (PFMA)
131
 further bestows upon county assemblies 
oversight powers over financial affairs of county government at various stages.
132
 
 
In terms of county planning, a county assembly is mandated to approve county plans and 
policies and county development planning,
133
 in addition to approving budgets, expenditures 
and borrowing by the county government.
134
 Accounting officers of county entities are 
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accountable to the county assembly.
135
 The nature and extent of the assembly’s oversight role 
is evaluated in greater detail in Chapter Three of the study whilst examining the Senate’s 
oversight role over county government finances. Lastly, county assemblies also play an 
important role in the process of constitutional amendment by popular initiative.
136
 
  
Notably, unlike Members of Parliament, the law also provides for specific roles of individual 
members of the county assembly besides these corporate roles.
137
 
 
2.4.3 Functions and powers of the Senate 
Whether a bicameral or unicameral system, and despite their variegated forms, the core role 
of legislatures remains three-fold, that is, making laws, oversight over the exercise of 
executive power and representation of special interests. The Senate represents counties and is 
charged with protecting the interests of the counties and their governments.
138
 In its 
legislative capacity at the national level, the Senate considers and approves bills concerning 
counties. Bills concerning counties are bills affecting functional competencies under the 
Fourth Schedule to the Constitution. They are also bills that affect the election of members of 
a county assembly or county executive or ones that affect the finances of county 
governments.
139
 In terms of finance allocation, the Senate co-determines both the vertical and 
horizontal allocations of the equitable share to counties. In its oversight role, the Senate 
oversees the finances of county governments. The oversight role is however limited to the 
national revenue allocation to the counties.
140
 
 
As part of the national legislature, the Senate acts as a check on the national executive, 
though to a lesser degree when compared to its counterpart, the National Assembly. For 
instance, the Senate is excluded from major appointments, such as independent offices 
(Auditor General and Controller of Budget), commissions and principal secretaries.
141
 
Nevertheless, the Senate has joint oversight responsibility over cabinet secretaries, 
commissions and independent offices.
142
 The Senate is mandated to participate in any 
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resolution to impeach the President or Deputy President. Although such a motion may only 
emanate from the National Assembly, the Senate retains the veto power.
143
 Similar to the 
United States, the Senate has the sole power to conduct impeachment trials.  
 
In addition to the constitutional powers, legislation provides that the Senate considers 
motions of impeachment against governors emanating from the county assembly, investigates 
and votes on the motions for removal.
144
 Moreover, the Transition to Devolved Government 
Act, 2012
145
 designates the Senate as an appeal body if a county government is dissatisfied 
with the decision of the Transition Authority to transfer functions to a county government. 
A more detailed discussion on the content and implication of the Senate’s constitutional 
functions in relation to the county governments is presented in the next chapter. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The Constitution entrusts governance of the country to the national and county levels of 
government. None of the two levels is subordinate to, or an agent of the other - each owes its 
existence to the Constitution and exercises delegated sovereign power derived directly from 
the people. Each of the 47 counties has a fully-fledged government structure comprising an 
executive and legislature. Similar to the President and the cabinet secretaries at the national 
level, the executive authority of a county government is vested in a governor, deputy 
governor and the CEC members. The county assembly provides checks and balances over the 
county executive in addition to its legislative role. Just like the senator, a governor is 
popularly elected by the county electorate. 
 
The Senate, on the other hand, is a body within the national government, and comprises 
largely senators who are popularly elected at the county level to protect and promote the 
interests of counties and county governments. The subsequent chapters discuss in detail how 
relations between the Senate and county governments have played out in practice.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Role of the Senate vis-à-vis County Governments 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The emerging conflicts between the Senate and the county governments mainly revolve 
around the nature and extent of the Senate’s role in relation to county governments. This 
chapter examines the two major roles of the Senate in respect to county governments - the 
representative and supervisory roles. The latter encompasses oversight and impeachment 
procedures. Through this chapter, it becomes evident that the Senate is designated as the 
‘promoter’ and ‘protector’ of interests of counties and county governments. It is argued that 
the Senate’s roles of oversight and impeachment processes have introduced hierarchical 
power relations, which have in turn fuelled rivalry between county governments and the 
Senate. It is also shown that some aspects in the constitutional design have brought about role 
confusion, weakened the Senate’s representative role and contributed to the conflicts pitting 
the governors against the Senate.  
 
The chapter begins by briefly examining the essence of representation in bicameral systems 
such as Kenya’s. It then explores the roles of the Senate under three themes: the 
constitutional and statutory framework underpinning the power; what the practice has been 
and where applicable, how the Kenyan courts have resolved disputes emanating from the 
discharge of these roles. A critique of the constitutional provisions in respect to each of the 
roles is also presented.  
 
3.2 Representative role of the Senate 
Parliaments have been said to be ‘the indispensable institutions of representative democracies 
around the world’.146 Despite their variegated forms and rules, their core mandate remains 
that of representing the people and ensuring that ‘public policy is informed by the citizens on 
whose lives they impact’.147 In bicameral systems, the core essence of second chambers is to 
represent interests that are unrepresented in the majoritarian first chamber.
148
 The nature of 
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these interests varies, depending on the design and nature of representation. In devolved 
systems, this representation has largely taken the form of territorial representation whereby 
members of the second chamber represent areas contiguous with subnational levels of 
government.
149
 The Kenyan Senate carries with it territorial representation of the 47 counties, 
with trace elements of special interests (women, persons with disabilities and the youth). 
 
3.2.1 Constitutional framework 
Article 96(1) of the Constitution categorically states that, ‘[t]he Senate represents the 
counties, and serves to protect the interests of the counties and their governments’. Thus, the 
Senate represents counties but not their governments.
150
 Nonetheless, the Senate is under a 
constitutional mandate to represent the interests of both counties and county governments. 
The terms ‘counties’ and ‘county governments’ are distinct terms, though in normal parlance 
are often used interchangeably, one to mean the other. As noted in the previous chapter, the 
county government consists of the governance machinery at the county level, which includes 
the CEC making up the executive arm and a county assembly as the legislative arm. The term 
‘county’ on the other hand is general, referring to the territorial units at the subnational level - 
the counties.
151
  
 
As a representative of the interests of counties and county governments, the Senate plays the 
role of ‘protector’ and ‘promoter’ of their interests. There are three major ways through 
which the Senate can do this: through legislative measures, through the allocation of revenue 
to counties and through countervailing the exercise of executive power over county affairs. 
These functions are discussed briefly below. 
Legislative measures 
The national legislative authority in Kenya rests with both Houses of Parliament.
152
 Notably, 
however, while the National Assembly may initiate any Bill (including those affecting 
counties), the legislative authority of the Senate is restricted to Bills concerning counties.
153
 
As seen in 2.4.3 above, as long as a Bill affects the functional competencies of counties falling 
under the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution or affects county finances under Chapter 12, 
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then it is classed as one affecting counties.
154
 Consequently, though the Senate’s legislative 
power is limited to county matters, the broad definition ‘creates room for the Senate to 
participate in the passing of bills in the exclusive functional areas of the national level of 
government for as long as it can be shown that such bills have provisions affecting the 
functional areas of the county governments’.155 However, a Bill affecting counties can 
emanate from either House.
156
 The confinement of the Senate’s legislative role to county 
matters is a further underscore of the primary responsibility of the Senate as protector of 
county interests and county governments.  
 
Through the legislative process, the Senate bears not only an active role in enacting and 
considering laws, but also a passive, but aggressive responsibility in ensuring that laws 
passed at the national level do not undermine counties and their governments. Furthermore, 
by rejecting bills it deems unfavourable or “anti-county governments,” the Senate can bolster 
consensus building, and better versions of a law more favourable to the interests of counties 
and their governments are likely to emerge.
157
 
 
With regard to constitutional amendments, the Senate, just like the National Assembly may 
initiate a motion for amendment.
158
 However, no constitutional amendment can sail through 
without a two thirds support from each of the two Houses.
159
 With respect to Article 255 
amendments, which include amendments affecting ‘the objects, principles and structure of 
devolved government’, a more rigorous process of constitutional amendment is required, 
including a referendum.
160
 Through its involvement in constitutional amendments, the Senate 
has yet another opportunity of safeguarding the interests of the devolved structures. 
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Allocation of revenue 
The Senate partakes in the consideration of the Bills for the vertical division of revenue 
between national and county governments and the horizontal sharing out of the equitable 
share among the 47 county governments. This is through consideration and approval of the 
annual Division of Revenue Bill (DRB) and the County Allocation of Revenue Bill (CARB) 
respectively.161 Following a ‘supremacy row’ between the two Houses of Parliament on 
whether a DRB was a matter concerning counties such that it justified the legislative input of 
the Senate, the Supreme Court of Kenya in Speaker of the Senate & another v Hon  Attorney-
General & another & 3 others advised that,‘[t]he Division of Revenue Bill, 2013 was an 
instrument essential to the due operations of county governments, as contemplated under the 
Constitution, and so was a matter requiring the Senate’s legislative contribution’.162 
 
Besides the vertical allocation of revenue between the two levels of government, the Senate is 
entrusted with the power to determine the horizontal allocation of national revenue among 
counties.163 Article 217 requires the Senate to determine the basis for horizontal allocation of 
the counties’ equitable share, once every five years. Such a determination can only be 
rejected by two thirds of National Assembly members. Moreover, the Senate enjoys a 
majority representation in the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA).164 CRA is a vital 
commission in revenue matters, being the body charged with making recommendations for 
the vertical and horizontal equitable sharing of revenue raised by the national government.165 
 
The participation of the Senate in revenue allocation processes would ensure that county 
governments receive a fair share of financial resources to enable them run their affairs. 
 
Counteracting executive’s interference  
As a bulwark for the counties, the Senate ensures that the executive does not execute 
decisions adverse to county interests or their governments. For instance, although the 
Constitution empowers the President to suspend a county government under certain special 
circumstances,
166
 no suspension can take place without the approval of the Senate. The 
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Senate is also empowered to terminate the suspension at any time.
167
 Similar checks apply to 
the stoppage of funds by the executive to a county government under Article 225(3) of the 
Constitution. In terms of the Constitution and the PFMA, an action for stoppage of funds by 
the Cabinet Secretary for Finance must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within 
thirty days.
168
 Parliament may also renew the stoppage of funds.
169
 
 
Protection of county boundaries is yet another avenue through which the Senate could 
endeavour to secure county interests. Under Article 188(1) of the Constitution, county 
boundaries may only be altered by a resolution of an independent commission set up by 
Parliament for that purpose and which resolution must be supported by a two thirds vote from 
both Houses. 
 
3.2.2 Critique on representative role 
Through representation of interests that would otherwise be unrepresented in a majoritarian 
unicameral House, a second House, such as the Kenya’s Senate is a critical tool for curtailing 
majority tyranny.
170
 Through delays of the legislative process and decision making, the 
Senate can encourage due consideration of policies, resulting in better quality decisions or 
what Riker terms as delaying action, ‘until a true majority is arrived at’, which allows for 
‘adoption of out-of-equilibrium policies’.171 
 
A key principle in the Senate’s representative role is that it is one based on equality, where 
each of the 47 counties is represented by one senator regardless of population size or number 
of constituencies within it. Equality in territorial representation is also practised in countries 
like the United States, the Federal Republic of Nigeria or even Switzerland.
172
 
 
The Senate acts as a counterbalance in a number of ways. If we look at Nairobi County for 
instance, which is the most populous county in Kenya at 3 138 369, it has only one senator, 
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the same as the five least populous counties - Lamu, Isiolo, Samburu, Tana River and Taita 
Taveta, whose total population is less than a third of that of Nairobi. Likewise, Samburu, 
Lamu and Isiolo Counties with two constituencies each enjoy equal representation in the 
Senate as Nairobi County which boasts 17 National Assembly elective seats.
173
 This ensures 
that the interests of people in densely populated areas do not always override those of people 
in less populated areas. In this way, the effect of ‘tyranny’ of numbers in the National 
Assembly is counterbalanced. It has been observed that such balance enhances representation 
of the smaller ethnic communities in the Senate, giving them a stronger voice, which is an 
advantage they do not get in the more populous first chamber.
174
 
 
Moreover, the insistence on delegate voting on matters concerning counties further bolsters 
the equality of votes, ensuring no county gets more say than the other. After elections, the 
members of the Senate in a county, inclusive of nominated members, constitute a single 
delegation. The delegate vote is cast on behalf of the county by the elected senator who heads 
the county delegation.
175
 Thus, the 20 nominated Senators (who obviously have their 
respective counties of origin where they are registered voters) do not have an independent 
vote over their ‘home counties’ in county matters.176 This means that the vote becomes not 
the vote of an individual senator but a county vote. This is vital in maintaining the equality 
and representation of county interests because if the 20 members were to be allowed to vote 
independently on county matters, it would disadvantage counties without nominated senators. 
In such a scenario, the majority Senate decision could mean a veto on the decision of the 
majority of counties and hence counties’ interests.177 Ghai and Bosire observe that the 
insistence on delegation-voting in county matters reflects the close link of the senators with 
the county and further emphasises, ‘the centrality of the county rather than other affiliations 
(like political)’.178 Delegate voting further underscores the role of the Senate as a protector of 
the counties’ interests, as the county vote essentially becomes a vote on the aggregate county 
issues. 
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The influence of party politics on representation vigour in both Houses cannot however be 
wished away. It is to speak in a vacuum to discuss the parliamentary role outside of the 
political game play. Thus, as Gallagher, Laver and Mair have observed, when we speak about 
Parliament, it is ‘not really…about the interaction of a large number of legislators’, but a 
constellation of ‘a small number of political parties’ in practical terms.179 In the Kenyan 
situation, party politics would especially have a significant influence on the representative 
and supervisory roles whereby a governor and a senator hail from different warring political 
parties, a situation that fuels competition and conflict between the office holders. As shall be 
seen in the latter part of the chapter, politics has been blamed as the motive behind the 
impeachment motions against governors and their deputies. 
 
The institutional design of the Constitution is such that it compromises on the representative 
role of the Senate and has promoted rivalry between the Senate and governors in two major 
ways: First, the Senate membership has weak linkages to the county governments which 
translate into equally weak representation of county governments at the national level. 
Secondly, the fact that the two Houses of Members of Parliament are directly elected and on 
the same day as the President means that the two Houses largely mirror each other in terms of 
political composition, thus diluting the Senate’s counterbalancing force at the national 
level.
180
 
 
Lijphart long argued that for there to be meaningful representation in bicameral systems, the 
chambers must be incongruent in their composition that is, they should be differently 
constituted, and the second chamber should have real power.
181
 It has similarly been argued 
elsewhere that when both houses are elected by similar methods, the upper house mirrors the 
lower house, thus obscuring the essence of a second house.
182
 The fact that the Kenyan 
Senate is selected in the same manner as the National Assembly and the same day as the rest 
of the elections means that the Senate elections are also much influenced by the political 
climate of the day. Therefore, more likely than not, the House’s political genetic make-up is a 
replica of the first chamber in terms of party representation and hence political control. True 
enough, a glimpse at the party strengths in the first general elections of March 2013 shows 
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that ‘Jubilee,’ the ruling party coalition dominates both Houses in similar proportions.183 This 
could affect the ‘independence’ with which the Senate can vigorously protect the interests of 
counties and counteract executive power owing to party allegiance. 
 
The second weakness relates to the mode of selection of the Senate members. A directly 
elected federal chamber has weak institutional links with the subnational governments.
184
 
While Kenyan senators have a direct link with the respective counties as they are directly 
elected by county voters, there is little nexus, if any, with the county governments. Plainly 
put, a senator is not a delegate and does not represent county governments but counties. 
Notwithstanding, the Senate is under a constitutional obligation to protect the interests of not 
only counties but also their governments. This becomes problematic considering the weak 
linkage to the latter and is determinative of the willingness and vigour with which the Senate 
promotes and protects the interests of county governments. Therefore, while direct election 
has afforded the Senate ‘democratic legitimacy’ and the requisite political clout necessary for 
transacting business at the national level,
185
 it has by the same token weakened the links with 
the governments at the county level whose interests it is also mandated to promote and 
protect.  
 
During the constitutional review process, a number of Kenyans had expressed concern over 
the weak linkages of the Senate to the county governments.
186
 Indirect election of senators 
was ‘perceived as a weakness’ as ‘persons of the right calibre were unlikely to emerge’.187 It 
was also argued that senators not popularly elected ‘would carry less weight than members of 
the proposed National Assembly’.188 This made a case for the present form of popular 
election of Senate members. 
 
The essence of weak representation of county governments by the Kenyan Senate is perhaps 
better appreciated by drawing a comparison with the German and South African systems. 
Germany’s Bundesrat, an equivalent of the Kenyan Senate, comprises representatives of the 
states or Land governments in the Bund (federal government). These delegates are essentially 
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members of state governments from Land who vote en bloc on instructions from the Land 
government.
189
 South Africa, which adapted its system from Germany, has a similar system 
of representation. The National Council of Provinces (NCOP), which represents the nine 
provinces in South Africa, comprises a single delegation from each province consisting of ten 
delegates. Each province has one vote which is cast on behalf of the province by the head of 
the delegation.
190
 This form of representation would, prima facie, favour strong 
representation of the subnational level governments, while eliminating the elements of 
competition and antagonism. It is however to be noted that even the strong representation 
expected in such a delegate system has in practice been compromised by the influence of 
party politics, as the case of South Africa’s NCOP, or even India’s Rajya Sabha 
demonstrates. Thus, as Bosire rightly concludes, ‘there is no universally preferred method of 
structuring the central representation of devolved units’ and there is no guarantee that ‘a 
particular design will bear the same fruit if it is transplanted elsewhere’.191 
 
The weak linkage of senators to the county governments would partly explain the ease and 
frequency with which the Senate and heads of county governments appear to be embroiled in 
tugs of wars. The situation is likely to be even more volatile if the governor and the senator 
from one county hail from different, rival political parties. 
 
3.2.3 The practice 
Despite the fact that the Constitution envisions that the Senate would play the role of a 
zealous protector and promoter of interests of counties and county governments, there are 
valid concerns that the discharge of its mandate has leaned more towards antagonising the 
interests of county governments. 
 
Take the case of legislative authority for instance, it is almost as if every Act emanating from 
Parliament and touching on county affairs signifies an additional petition in Court by 
governors challenging its constitutionality. Indeed, in less than four months after taking 
office, the Senate introduced a Bill seeking inter alia to stop governors from flying national 
flags on their vehicles, a move seen to be geared towards ‘trimming the county bosses to 
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size’192 This Bill has since been enacted into law as the National Flag, Emblems and Names 
(Amendment) Act, 2014
193
. The Act raised a red flag for the Council of County Governors 
(“Council of Governors”) which challenged it in Court.194 In the meantime, hot on the heels 
was the Order of Precedence Bill, 2014
195
 originating from the National Assembly, dealing 
with the issue of protocol and forms of address of state officers. Similar to its predecessor, the 
Bill ranked the governor at a humble position seven in the pecking order, below the Members 
of Parliament (MPs). The Bill also proposed to deny governors the right to fly the Kenyan 
flags and sirens on their vehicles in addition to stripping the governor of the title of ‘His 
Excellency’. A governor is to contend with being referred to as ‘Governor’ with no prefixes 
or courtesy form of address.
196
 This again goes to show the power struggles that continue to 
pit governors against the Houses of Parliament, singularly and collectively. 
 
Furthermore, the enactment of the impugned County Governments (Amendment) Act, 2014 
and the proposed County Industrial Development Bill, 2014, which designates senators as 
chairpersons of development forums in counties, leans towards undermining county 
government autonomy. A detailed appraisal of these laws is provided in Chapter Four of the 
study wherein the role of a senator in county affairs is explored. 
 
With regard to county revenue, governors apparently no longer trust the Senate’s ability or 
willingness to promote their interests by ensuring that the percentage allocation of national 
revenue to counties is enhanced. This is despite the fact that the Senate commands 
representation of the majority members in the CRA, a critical body charged with the 
allocation of revenue, quite apart from the fact that the Senate also participates in the passing 
of the DRB. That would explain why governors launched a referendum campaign dubbed 
‘Pesa Mashinani,’197 seeking to collect signatures so as to amend the Constitution through 
popular initiative. One of the key issues sought is the enhancement of the amount of equitable 
share to counties from the current base of 15 percent to not less than 45 percent of the most 
recently audited accounts. At the time of concluding the study, a draft Constitution of Kenya 
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(Amendment) Bill, 2014 was in the offing.
198
 The Pesa Mashinani initiative has further 
exacerbated rifts between senators and governors, rather than unified them.
199
  
 
3.3 The Senate’s oversight role 
3.3.1 Constitutional and legislative framework 
In order to holistically appreciate the oversight role of the Senate over county governments, it 
is worth noting here that the Constitution establishes the Auditor-General (AG) and the 
Controller of Budget as Independent Offices for purposes of financial management in 
Kenya.
200
 Within six months after the end of each financial year, the Constitution requires the 
AG to conduct an audit of accounts of both national and county governments and all state 
organs and other entities funded by public funds.
201
 The AG’s reports are required to be 
submitted to Parliament ‘or the relevant county assembly’, which in turn must consider the 
report and take appropriate action within three months of receipt of the audit reports.
202
 
 
The Controller of Budget (CoB) is mandated to oversee the implementation of the budgets of 
both national and county governments and approves withdrawals from public funds. The CoB 
is required to submit a report every four months to each House of Parliament on the 
implementation of the budgets of national and county governments. According to the CoE, 
separation of the two offices was critical to ensuring financial management was carried out in 
accordance with the law. While the AG would perform ‘post-mortems’ on financial dealings 
to check on compliance, the CoB was crucial to monitoring compliance throughout the 
process.
203
 
 
The PFMA confers on the relevant Senate committee on public finance various general 
responsibilities.
204
 The responsibilities include presenting proposals to the Senate for the 
basis of allocating revenue among the counties and considering any bill dealing with county 
financial matters. The Senate Committee is also charged with reviewing the CARB and the 
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DRB and examining financial statements and other documents submitted to the Senate under 
Part IV of the PFMA Act. Under the Senate Standing Orders, 2013 the County Public 
Accounts and Investments Committee is the sessional committee of the Senate charged with 
the oversight over national revenue allocated to county governments.
205
 The Standing Orders 
also charge the Committee with examining CoB’s reports on the implementation of the 
budgets of the county governments. The Committee is also tasked with the AG’s reports on 
the annual accounts and generally exercising oversight over county public accounts and 
investments.
206
 
 
Where does that leave the county assembly’s oversight role? Article 185(3) of the 
Constitution mandates the county legislature to exercise oversight over the CEC ‘and any 
other county organ’. Article 226(2) further stipulates that ‘the accounting officer of a county 
public entity is accountable to the county assembly for its financial management’. It is worth 
pointing out here that a ‘county public entity’ is not a synonym for ‘county government’. The 
PFMA defines the term ‘county government entity’ as, ‘any department or agency of a 
county government, and any authority, body or other entity declared to be a county 
government entity under section 5(1)’.207 While the law provides for accounting officers for 
the county assemblies and county public entities, it is not clear who the accounting officer for 
the county government/executive is.  
 
The central question with regard to the financial oversight over counties has been whether 
and to what extent the Senate should probe into the financial affairs of counties; should the 
Senate for instance be allowed to summon and grill governors? 
 
3.3.2 Critique on the oversight provisions 
The constitutional provision relating to the Senate’s oversight over county finances presents 
two major problems. The first is the lack of clarity in law on the jurisdictional divides 
between county assemblies and the Senate in oversight function over county government 
finances. Put differently, it is not clear when the oversight role of the county assembly ends 
and where that of the Senate begins. The Senate’s oversight power is said to be strictly 
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limited to the equitable share and other conditional or unconditional grants emanating from 
the national government.
208
 This essentially means that the Senate’s oversight power is 
considerable, given that the bulk of the revenue for most counties emanates from the national 
government rather than county revenue. Nevertheless, an examination of the relevant 
oversight provisions under the Constitution, the CGA and the PFMA reveals that a county 
assembly has a wide remit to oversee all the financial resources of the county, including 
revenues allocated by the national government and the revenue generated locally by the 
respective county.
209
  
 
Another concern, flowing from the first, regards the practicality of the role sharing between 
the Senate and county assemblies. How is a county assembly, for instance to exercise 
‘selective oversight’ by requiring accounting officers of county public entities to account only 
for the use of monies not emanating from national government? How identifiable and 
separable is the national revenue from other revenue sources in county spending in the first 
place? Evidently, the oversight role over county finances is unclear and this has brought 
about role confusion and even bred conflicts between the county assembly and the Senate, as 
will be seen shortly. 
 
The second problem concerns ineffective oversight tools for the Senate. Even though the 
Senate’s County Public Accounts and Investments Committee is charged with the Article 
96(3) oversight, there are no tangible mechanisms at the Senate’s disposal to ensure 
compliance. While the Constitution empowers Parliament through its committees to summon 
any person to appear before it to give evidence or provide information, there is no clear rule 
as what hard measures are available in case of adverse findings.
210
 This effectively consigns 
the Senate’s oversight role to a passive one, what Bosire aptly terms as ‘scrutiny’ and 
‘naming and shaming’.211 In order for the oversight role to have logical meaning, then it 
would be expected that the Senate would have the ability to penalise whenever the need 
arises.  
It is however arguable that this state of affairs is indicative of the anticipated role sharing 
between the two assemblies with regard to oversight over county governments - that the law 
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 Art 96(2) Constitution. 
209
 See also International Legal Consultancy Group v Senate & another [2014] eKLR para 62. 
210
 Art 125 Constitution. Save for the vague provision under Article 125(2) that confers upon the relevant House 
or its Committee the equivalence of High Court powers in issuance of summonses, to among other things, 
‘enforce the attendance of witnesses and examine them on oath, affirmation or otherwise’.  
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must have been intended such that the primary role of oversight over county finances rests 
with the county assembly and not with the Senate. This could be so given that the county 
assembly has at its disposal an array of measures including disapproving county plans, 
policies and budgets, not forgetting the most potent ‘arsenal’-the initiation of impeachment 
motions against governors. 
 
Article 229 providing that the AG’s reports may be submitted to Parliament ‘or’ the relevant 
county assembly portends a likely standoff over the oversight role. The use of the disjunctive 
term ‘or’ is problematic. What criteria is the AG to use in determining whether to lay the 
report before a county assembly ‘or’ the Senate? Given the joint oversight responsibility, it is 
submitted here that the reports would be useful to both the county assemblies and the Senate. 
The Senate would require the reports in exercise of its Article 96 mandate, while the county 
assemblies also need to be furnished with these reports in order to effectively discharge their 
role as the primary oversight organs over their county governments and the body with 
effective oversight tools. In view of this, the conjunctive term ‘and’ would have been more 
appropriate, although this would be unhelpful in solving the jurisdictional overlap. What for 
instance happens when the reports are tabled in both Houses - are the ‘appropriate actions’ by 
the Senate and county assemblies to be taken concurrently or consecutively? What if there is 
a clash of opinions or ‘appropriate actions’ of the assemblies? 
 
3.3.3 The Practice 
Tugs of war between the Senate and the county government punctuated with court cases have 
characterised Senate’s oversight role over county finances.212 The Senate has been 
summoning governors to account for financial management of their counties. Governors are 
opposed to this move, maintaining they are accountable to the county legislatures. They see 
the issuance of summonses as a ploy to undermine their stature and through the Chairperson 
of the Council of Governors have vowed not to honour the summonses, with some opting to 
send chief finance officers and the CEC in charge of finance.
213
 These officers have been 
turned away, with the Senate Committee insisting on personal appearances of the 
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 International Legal Consultancy. See also Wanambisi L ‘Kenya: Reprieve for Three Governors over Senate 
Summons’ Capital FM 25 August 2014.  
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governors.
214
 Senators assert that as the county chief executives, governors must be made 
accountable for public moneys and must therefore personally appear before the Senate 
committee. The chairperson of the Senate’s Committee on Devolution is reported to have 
remarked, rather comically: 
‘We have told the governors you can go to court, call for a referendum, hide in the forest, you 
can fly high or even run to your relatives but ultimately you must appear before the Senate to 
answer questions of accountability. 
 
Am asking my brothers the governors to learn to appear before the Senate so that they can get 
used and not fear to appear before the big man in heaven when the time comes to account for 
our lives because there is neither referendum nor courts.’215 
 
The governors read mischief in this whole accountability business which they see as a ‘veil’ 
to power play, a belittling of their authority and an attempt at derailing devolution.
216
 With 
these accusations and counter accusations, the environment has been charged and ‘daggers’ 
drawn out as ‘battles’ reign supreme. Never mind the all-important common denominator, 
that the ‘warring’ parties both represent the interests of one subnational unit; the county. 
 
The Senate’s oversight role has not only upset the county executive up, but also the county 
legislature. Members of the County Assembly (MCAs) have complained that, ‘[t]he Senate 
has resorted to interrogating daily activities of county executives, ignoring the role of the 
assemblies’.217 The MCAs maintained that it was within their jurisdiction to probe the 
financial queries raised in the AG’s reports touching on the expenditures of county 
governments. The Chairperson of the Senate’s Public Accounts and Investment Committee is 
reported to have stated that the county legislature lacked the capacity to grill the governors. 
The irate MCAs threatened to seek advice from the Supreme Court over the situation.
218
 
The issuance of summonses by the Senate committee to governors has often been 
accompanied by the ‘freezing’ of county funds to compel appearance. This raises pertinent 
legal questions such as the Senate’s authority in the stoppage of funds process, given that 
such mandate constitutionally vests in the executive under Article 225 of the Constitution. An 
in-depth discussion on this is however outside the scope of this study; suffice to note that 
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both the Constitution and the PFMA provide for the substantive and procedural requirements 
to apply in stopping county funds.
219
 For instance, stoppage of funds can only be made for 
‘serious material breach or persistent material breaches’220 and no more than 50 percent of the 
amount may be stopped.
221
 The law also provides for certain procedural aspects in the 
stoppage of funds.
222
 It is doubtful whether these requirements have been followed.  
The Constitution and the law anticipate that the Senate is to review the drastic intervention by 
the executive of stopping funds to county governments. Ironically, there appears to be a 
readiness, whether justified or otherwise on the part of the ‘protector’ to sanction the 
stoppage of the funds at the ‘slightest provocation’, to the detriment of the county 
governments whose interests it is charged to promote and protect. 
 
3.3.4 Judicial intervention 
How have the Kenyan Courts resolved this impasse? In International Legal Consultancy, the 
Court recognised the jurisdictional untidiness occasioned by the power overlap between the 
two assemblies and recommended amendments to the law in order ‘to guide the Senate and 
the County Assemblies on how they should co-operate in the oversight of national revenue 
allocated to the County… while respecting the principle of separation of powers’.223 
 
The petitioner in International Legal Consultancy had challenged Senate’s decision to 
summon nine governors and county executive members responsible for finance to appear 
before it and respond to various financial queries within their counties. The summonses were 
apparently issued pursuant to Article 125 of the Constitution.
224
 The petitioner contended that 
the Senate’s oversight role over county finances was limited to special circumstances, such as 
where there was a stoppage of funds by the national government, or suspension of a county 
government under Article 192, or impeachment proceedings. The petitioner decried that, by 
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issuing the impugned summonses, the Senate had usurped the oversight role accorded to the 
county assemblies by the Constitution and that this was a further attempt at subjugating the 
county government.
225
 
 
Six key principles could be distilled from the High Court’s decision in the International 
Legal Consultancy. First, that in respect of the values enshrined in the Constitution and the 
principles and objects of devolution on democratic and accountable exercise of power, 
persons managing county finances, including a governor must be held to account and could 
be summoned by the Senate in the exercise of its oversight mandate under Article 96(3) of 
the Constitution.
226
 
 
Secondly, that the Senate’s oversight role is restricted to the national revenue allocated to the 
counties and as such, ‘has no oversight over grants, loans and revenue generated locally by 
the counties’.227 Thus, the Senate may not venture into any other aspect of County 
Government operations and resources as that is the preserve of the County Assembly. 
 
Thirdly, the power to summon must not be done arbitrarily and capriciously. Such summons 
must be in pursuance of the Senate’s constitutional mandate. This was also emphasised in the 
JSC case
228
 where the High court observed that, ‘the Constitution does not envisage that any 
one organ of state, in exercising its oversight role over another, should make haphazard or 
un-coordinated incursions of inquiry into the mandate of another state organ or independent 
commission or office’.229 
 
Fourthly, the power of oversight must be exercised with due regard to the spirit and letter of 
the Constitution, including respect for the separation of powers and the ‘distinctiveness’ of 
county governments.  The Senate must thus exercise some degree of deference and ‘refrain 
from acting in a manner that could be construed as micro-managing devolved units at the 
county level’.230 
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Fifthly, in the spirit of co-operative governance that requires organs of government to avoid 
litigating against one another, the issuance of summons by the Senate against county 
governments must be as a last measure after other ‘friendlier’ options such as consultations 
and mediation have been unsuccessfully explored.  Put another way, ‘the Senate should only 
issue summons to Governors or other Officers of the County Government as a matter of last 
resort where it is clear that the County Governors and other County Officials have declined 
an invitation by the Senate or its Committee(s) to answer to matters of oversight of County 
Funds’.231 
 
Finally, in case of any disputes arising between the county Governments and the Senate, 
efforts must be made to amicably settle the disputes outside the courts.  The Senate and 
county governments must cooperate and engage on a platform of mutual relations and 
consultations as opposed to engaging in adversarial relations. Courts should thus only be used 
‘as a last point of call’.232 
 
3.3.5 Assessment 
Although the Courts have provided important guidelines with regard to the exercise of the 
Senate’s oversight role, critical issues such as the division of powers between the two 
assemblies require clarification. The fact that the Senate’s oversight is only limited to 
national revenue dispersed to county does not ameliorate the situation and in fact worsens it 
since, as stated earlier, national revenue accounts for the bulk of the county revenue. This will 
be the situation for possibly a long time until county governments become more financially 
independent and increase their revenue generating capacity to levels like say, South Africa 
whereby most of the revenue for municipalities is self-generated.  
 
It is a canon of constitutional interpretation that a constitution be construed holistically, 
without any one of the provisions destroying the other but each sustaining each other.
233
As 
such, the oversight mandate of the Senate cannot be wished away just as that of the county 
assembly cannot be underplayed. Both are constitutional provisions and must be read on par 
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with each other and in a manner that resonates with other constitutional principles. No 
constitutional provision can be said to be unconstitutional.
234
 
 
There are two possible solutions to resolving the confusion regarding the oversight role of the 
two assemblies. The first option is to adopt a broad interpretation of the term ‘oversight’ not 
restricted to the finances, as suggested by the petitioner in the International Legal 
Consultancy. This would provide a restrictive application of the Senate’s oversight mandate 
under Article 96(3) of the Constitution which reads that, ‘[t]he Senate determines the 
allocation of national revenue among counties, as provided in Article 217, and exercises 
oversight over national revenue allocated to the county governments’. Such an interpretation 
would confine the Senate’s oversight to an aggregate level. For instance, the provision could 
be read to restrict the Senate’s oversight to assessing revenue allocation under Article 217 as 
read with the criteria for equitable sharing under Article 203 of the Constitution. In this case, 
the Senate would be more concerned in say, establishing whether such criteria is effective for 
purposes of meeting the objects of devolution and indeed protecting the interests of counties 
generally. In impeachment procedures, the Senate’s oversight role would ensure that the 
procedure for impeachment is followed by the county assembly, sitting as a review body. 
Additionally, the Senate’s oversight role could be circumscribed within the national 
government’s intervention measures over county affairs discussed in 3.2.1.3 above; for 
example, with regard to stoppage of funds or the suspension of a county government under 
Articles 225
235
 and 192 of the Constitution respectively.  
 
The above avenues have been deliberately set out to demonstrate that the Senate’s oversight 
role needs to be read outside the narrow confines of audit reports and summoning the 
governors, which is a role better exercised by the county assemblies. Such an ‘outward’ 
reading of the Senate’s oversight powers would then resolve conflicts and the question of 
who is responsible for which monies. Such an interpretation is preferable, as it preserves the 
Senate’s oversight mandate and is also consistent with the core mandate of the Senate in 
protecting and promoting county interests. It is also advantageous in that it supports core 
devolution principles such as the vertical division of powers between the two levels of 
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government and is also in line with the national values and principles, including devolution of 
power and good governance.  
The second and most drastic action is to amend the Constitution and completely divest the 
Senate of its oversight role over the finances of county governments in whatever form. 
Practically, however, this is most unlikely since, as mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, such 
an amendment would require the concurrence of both Houses of Parliament in order pass.
236
 
Naturally, the Senate would probably not vote, by a two-thirds majority, to divest itself of 
such power.  
Accountability and transparency form part of the national values and principles under Article 
10 of the Constitution and resonate throughout the Constitution. Indeed, promoting 
‘accountable exercise of power’ and the enhancement of checks and balances are amongst the 
objects of devolution under Article 174. It is thus in the interests of counties that these 
principles pervade the county governments. Even so, the process of entrenching these vital 
principles must be counterbalanced against other, equally fundamental principles of 
devolution, including the division of powers between the two levels of government. The 
manner in which the oversight role has been carried out would appear to lean more towards 
undermining county autonomy. For instance, the insistence on personal appearances of the 
governors in all cases and the almost instantaneous stoppage of funds would appear to be 
unreasonable, and points more to a ‘power play’ than to the genuine exercise of the oversight 
mandate; the ‘let’s-see-who-the-boss-is’. Indiscriminate issuance of summonses to the chief 
executives, and the stoppage of funds may be counter-productive, as it compromises on 
development and service delivery, the very essence of a devolved system. 
 
Regarding accounting officers, the High Court in International Legal Consultancy the Court 
suggested the county accounting officers as the appropriate persons.
237
 This is still tricky 
since the Constitution is categorical in stating that accounting officers of county public 
entities are accountable to the county assembly.
238
 It is desirable to have clarity in law on 
who the accounting officer of a county government is and whether such power is delegable. 
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3.4 Impeachment procedure 
None of the Senate’s roles has evoked more furore than impeachment processes against 
governors and their deputies. The Senate plays a strategic role, being the second port of call, 
after a county assembly and on which the fate of an embattled governor ultimately rests.
239
 
 
3.4.1 Constitutional and legislative Framework  
The Constitution and the CGA provide a procedure for the removal of a governor.
240
 The 
Senate and county assemblies (“the assemblies”) also have in-house rules governing the 
processes.
241
 Notably, the procedure for the removal of governors also applies to deputy 
governors.
242
 A governor may be impeached on the following grounds;  
‘(a) gross violation of this Constitution or any other law;  
(b) where there are serious reasons for believing that the county governor has committed 
a crime under national or international law; 
(c) abuse of office or gross misconduct; or 
(d) physical or mental incapacity to perform the functions of office of county 
governor.’243 
 
The procedure for the removal of a governor is as follows: First, such a motion is initiated by 
a member of a county assembly by giving notice to the county assembly speaker. The motion 
must be supported by at least two-thirds of the MCA’s. If the motion is supported by the 
county assembly, the speaker then informs the Speaker of the Senate of that resolution within 
two days. After receipt of the notice, the Senate Speaker is required to convene a Senate 
meeting to hear charges against the governor. For this purpose, the Senate, by resolution, may 
appoint a special committee comprising eleven of its members to investigate the matter and 
report to the Senate on whether the allegations are substantiated.  The committee must report 
back to the House within ten days.  
 
If the special committee reports that the particulars of any allegation against the governor are 
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unsubstantiated, no further proceedings are to be taken in respect of that allegation but if it 
finds otherwise, the Senate proceeds to vote on the impeachment charges after according the 
governor an opportunity to be heard. If a majority of all the members of the Senate vote to 
uphold any impeachment charge, the governor ceases to hold office. However, if a vote in the 
Senate fails to result in the removal of the governor, the Senate Speaker is required to notify 
the county assembly speaker.  
 
According to the CGA, the removal of a governor on the same charges cannot be re-
introduced to the Senate within three months from the date of such vote. It is worth noting 
that since the impeachment process is a matter concerning the counties, Senators vote as 
county delegations.  
 
3.4.2 Critique on impeachment provisions 
The constitutional and statutory provisions on impeachment of governors present two main 
difficulties. First, giving the Senate, a body at the national level, a role over the impeachment 
process of governors who are heads of the counties effectively creates hierarchical power 
relations. Secondly, the fact that the procedural aspects of the impeachment process are 
governed by legislation and the rules of the assemblies as opposed to the Constitution is 
problematic, given that the environment under which the processes take place are politically 
charged. It is then no wonder that rules of assemblies have been disregarded in the 
impeachment processes. This shall become clearer when an examination of the practice is 
made in the succeeding segment.  
 
3.4.3 The practice 
At the time of concluding this research, the Senate had presided over four impeachment 
processes and one more awaited the Senate’s determination; this is not a number to raise 
eyebrows before one considers the fact that these happened within a span of less than two 
years since county governments took office. Two of these proceedings involved the 
Governors of Embu and Kericho, while the third one related to the Deputy Governor of 
Machakos County. There was also one for Deputy Governor of Embu County which was 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
carried out concomitantly with that of the governor.
244
 The impeachment process for the 
Makueni Governor awaited the Senate’s impeachment following the issuance of temporary 
court orders halting the process. A few critical issues have emerged with regard to the manner 
of removal of county leaders from office at both the county level and the Senate. 
 
Members of the County Assembly (MCAs) have been accused of driving a political agenda 
through threats of impeachment motions against the county executives.
245
 There have been 
claims that the MCAs’ clamor for allowances, personal assistants and overseas trips has 
fuelled some of the impeachment motions when these demands are not met by the chief 
executives.
246
 Impeachment motions have therefore been used as bargaining tools to 
blackmail governors and other CEC members. There have even been claims that some 
MCA’s have demanded bribes in order to ‘save a governor’s skin’.247 
 
Figure 3.4 below shows, rather satirically, Kenyan MCAs donned in sports and casual attire 
at the 2014 World Cup stadium in Brazil, ostensibly to learn about devolution. There are 
allegations that unmet demands such as allowances and overseas trips have upset MCAs, 
leading to stand offs in approvals of county plans/budgets and triggering impeachment 
motions. In the Makueni county for instance, the embattled Governor accused MCAs of 
‘frustrating his government by failing to pass the budget’ for the 2014/2015 fiscal year, 
amongst other allegations.
248
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Figure 3.4 MCAs’ demands for perks and overseas trips 
 
Source: GADO cartoons. 
Such stand offs have in some cases escalated to the point of paralysing county government, as 
was the case with Makueni county. Exasperated by the irreconcilable differences between the 
MCAs and the county executive which had led to a stalemate in service delivery, the 
Governor and a section of county residents favoured a campaign dubbed ‘Operation Okoa 
Makueni” (Operation save Makueni) aimed at collecting signatures in order to petition the 
President to dissolve the county and have fresh elections conducted.
249
  
 
Vendettas and malice have also been cited as being behind some of the impeachment 
proceedings. Thus, it has been reported that MCAs are using impeachment motions to settle 
scores and ‘teach the Governors a lesson’. In the first impeachment motion against the 
Governor of Embu County,
250
 (Wambora I), it was alleged that the Governor had been 
uncooperative regarding recruitment and payment schemes of salaries payable to persons 
employed in the County Assembly Service Board. Apparently, the Governor had acted upon 
the advice of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission and the CoB, whose unfavourable 
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response stirred up sour relations.
251
 Consequently, the High Court found that the 
impeachment of the Governor ‘was a deliberate scheme hatched to settle scores and was 
actuated with malice, bad faith, ill spite, witch-hunting and revenge’.252 
 
Similarly, in the impeachment of the Kericho Governor, it was alleged that the filing of a 
constitutional petition in court
253
 by the county executive seeking interpretation of the 
division of roles between the county assembly and the executive had bred bad blood. In the 
petition, the county executive had complained that the county assembly was overstepping its 
mandate in its oversight function in disregard of the principle of separation of powers. 
Reportedly, on the day of court attendance, some MCAs led demonstrations against the 
Governor and a motion of impeachment was filed the same day and posted on the website.
254
 
 
Moreover, there have been allegations that MCAs are being used to perpetuate certain 
political agendas. MCAs have kept governors ‘on their toes’ with threats of impeachment 
motions, leaving the county executive with the option of either walking on egg shells around 
the affairs of a devolved unit which they head, or risk impeachment. This is an impossible 
environment for service and development delivery to take place. The cartoon below (figure 
3.5) by Gado illustrates Makueni County MCAS (as rats) devouring on the cat (the 
Governor) right down to the bone. This is telling of what has become of impeachment 
motions. 
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Figure 3.5: Devouring the executives: When rats eat cats 
 
 
Source: GADO cartoons. 
 
Unsurprisingly, complaints of ‘rushed’ and ‘stage-managed’ processes and flouting of 
Assembly Rules have been reported. For instance, in moving the motion for the removal of 
deputy-governor for Machakos, the deputy Governor of Machakos is said to have complained 
that ‘the impeachment process before the County Assembly of Machakos was so 
systematically rushed and stage-managed and that the same did not amount to a fair 
hearing.’255 
 
With this state of affairs, the Senate could be the body expected to ‘save the situation’, being 
the second port of call and review body in impeachment motions. This has however not 
always been the case, as the Senate is not blameless in its conduct of impeachment processes. 
Similar to the county assemblies, the House has been accused of being driven by a political 
agenda in their procedure of impeachment processes. Embattled governors have attributed 
                                                          
255
 See Senate Hansard of 15 August 2014: 7. 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
their fate to politics by the national legislators.
256
 The Senate has even threatened to disobey 
temporary court orders halting the impeachment and oversight processes.
257
 In fact, in 
Wambora I, both the county assembly and the Senate had proceeded with impeachment 
processes against the Embu governor, despite a court order temporarily barring the process. It 
is actually the disobedience of the court orders that led to the nullification of the process as 
the High Court firmly stated that, ‘anything done in disobedience of court orders is null and 
void ab initio and is a nullity in law’.258 The Senate’s eagerness to discharge these two roles 
seemingly ‘at all costs’ again points more towards power play than the genuine exercise of a 
constitutional mandate. 
 
Moreover, there are attempts to expand avenues for the removal of governors to include 
parliamentary petition. If the County Governments (Amendment) Bill, 2014
259
 originating 
from the National Assembly is passed into law, members of the public will be able to petition 
either House of Parliament for removal of governors regardless of their home county. The 
primary purpose of the Bill according to its memorandum of objects is to, ‘provide for the 
involvement of either House of Parliament in the removal of a governor from office’. 
Although the memorandum of objects to the Bill states that the aim of the legislative proposal 
is to ‘protect the gubernatorial office holders from politically instigated unanimous removal 
from office’ and ensure that ‘the removal of gubernatorial office holders is free from political 
motivations and abuse informed by personal interest,’ it is unclear how the law would 
achieve that purpose.
260
 It is submitted that if such a proposal passes into law, it leaves the 
county executives in an undesirably more vulnerable position, and this is not in the interests 
of county governments. 
 
In a desperate attempt to secure their increasingly precarious positions, the ‘besieged’ 
governors have called for a more stringent process in their removal, similar to the recall 
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procedure for MPs and MCAs.
261
 In their Pesa Mashinani campaign, the governors want a 
constitutional amendment to the effect that they or their deputies cannot be impeached 
‘unless grounds of impeachment are confirmed by the High Court’.262 
 
3.4.4 Judicial intervention 
The High Court has a supervisory role over the removal of a governor from office with the 
aim of ‘[ensuring] that the procedure and threshold provided for in the Constitution and the 
County Governments Act are followed’.263 In resolving cases over impeachment processes 
that have been presented before it, the court has elucidated on both the substantive and 
procedural aspects of the impeachment processes. For the removal of a governor from office 
to be valid, ‘the process used must strictly adhere to both the substantive and the procedural 
law contained in both Article181 of the Constitution and Section 33 of the Act 
respectively’.264 
 
The High Court in Wambora I clarified that the Senate was not intended to be merely a 
rubber stamping authority to impeachment motions. The court has ruled that the 
impeachment process is ‘sequential and hierarchical in nature’265 and that the impeachment 
process is meant to be a ‘self-correcting’ mechanism’ such that any errors in the county 
assembly are detected and corrected at the Senate level. Thus, ‘where the Senate finds that 
the resolution is not properly before it then it is not obliged to admit’.266 This way, the Senate 
exercises review power over the county assembly impeachment process. 
 
What is the threshold for the removal of a governor? The courts have unequivocally stated 
that it is not every violation of the Constitution or written law that can lead to the removal of 
a governor. It has to amount to ‘gross’. What amounts to a gross violation is to be determined 
by the facts in each specific case.
267
 The Courts have also set down the criteria for assessing 
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whether a matter qualifies to be termed ‘gross’ so as to justify unseating of a governor. The 
allegations against the governor must: 
           ‘(a) Be serious, substantial and weighty. 
(b) There must be a nexus between the Governor and the alleged gross violations of the 
Constitution or any other written law. 
(c) The charges framed against the Governor and the particulars thereof must disclose a gross 
violation of the Constitution or any other written law. 
(d) The charges as framed must state with a degree of precision the Article (s) or even sub-
Article(s) of the Constitution or the provisions of any other written law that have been alleged 
to be grossly violated’.268 
 
The Appellate Court in Wambora observed that the removal of a Governor ‘is a constitutional 
and political process…a sui generis process that is quasi-judicial in nature’ and that, the rules 
of natural justice and fair administrative action must be observed.’269 The courts have also 
emphasised that it is individual responsibility as opposed to collective responsibility that 
forms grounds for impeachment. As such, the act or omission complained of ‘must have been 
done or undertaken with the knowledge, consent or connivance of the person charged’.270 The 
Courts have also set the standard of proof required for the removal of a governor, to be above 
a balance of probability but below beyond reasonable doubt.
271
 
 
3.4.5 Assessment 
What emerges from case law and the previous impeachment processes is that there is no one 
size fits all mathematical formula for the threshold for the removal of a governor and it is 
more a subjective test based on the particular set of facts and circumstances of each case. It is 
paramount that impeachment processes, being such that they portend drastic repercussions 
not just for the individual involved, but also for the electorate, the bodies charged with its use 
must exercise great circumspection in mounting motions of impeachment. As such, 
impeachment should be sparingly resorted to and only used in circumscribed 
circumstances.
272
 The grounds stipulated to warrant such a process should strictly and 
faithfully guide the process to prevent the mechanism being abused for collateral purposes. 
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Not any and every wrong befits an impeachment motion As was stated in Muyia Inakoju & 
Others: 
‘Section 188 is not a weapon available to the Legislature to police a Governor or Deputy 
Governor in every wrong doing. A Governor or Deputy Governor, as a human being, cannot 
always be right and he cannot claim to be right always. That explains why section 188 talks 
about gross misconduct.’273 
 
With the Senate wielding the ultimate power over the security of the governors through the 
impeachment motions, it is hard to speak of balanced power relations. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, the role has provided fertile ground for power strife between senators and 
governors. That impeachment processes have been marred by politics and selfish interests is a 
reality and unless this mechanism is reined on, it is likely to be more a liability to devolution 
than serve the well-intended purpose of bolstering good governance. With the MCAs 
brandishing impeachment motions as weapons for self-gain, and, given the immense power 
over budget and development plans at the county level, the situation is dire as far as the 
stability of county governments is concerned. County executives cannot freely and optimally 
discharge their mandate with a ‘guillotine’ in the form of impeachment motions constantly 
hanging over their head. Development and service delivery risk being compromised as 
misappropriation of funds at the county level go unabated if the same is sanctioned by the 
MCAs charged with an oversight role.  
 
Given that the impeachment process is an escalated mechanism between the two assemblies, 
the Senate, exercising quasi-judicial powers, would ensure that county assemblies abide by 
the due process and the rules. The previous impeachment proceedings however point more to 
deference of the county processes at the expense of review.
274
 In the absence of such critical 
review, the High Courts’ supervisory powers remain vital in impeachment processes in order 
to safeguard devolution by ensuring that the threshold and due process of the law are 
followed. 
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The mayhem surrounding impeachment processes strongly suggests that the current state of 
affairs, whereby the procedural aspects of the impeachment process are purely governed by 
legislation and erratic rules of the assemblies, is precarious and requires reinforcement. 
Grounding the process in the Constitution is not only a recognition of the stature that the 
governors wield in the devolved system as heads of county governments but will ensure 
certainty and uniformity in application of the procedures, while sealing loopholes for its 
abuse. A more stringent and elaborate process in which more time is given for substantive 
consideration and investigation of the claims is equally desirable. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The oversight and impeachment roles have undoubtedly been the main centres of conflicts 
between governors and the Senate. The constitutional and statutory framework governing 
these roles is not watertight and has caused uncertainties and role confusion as is the case 
with the oversight role between the Senate and county assemblies. The oversight and 
impeachment procedures have introduced power relations between county governments and 
the Senate creating fertile ground for power struggles, hence the ensuing conflicts. However, 
as the practice reveals, structural weaknesses are not the only source of combative relations 
between governors and the Senate. Exogenous factors, including power play, politics and 
greed appear to have taken over and diluted the essence of the well-intended powers of 
oversight and impeachment, as mechanisms meant to entrench accountability and good 
governance at the county level. These factors have also compromised on the representative 
role of the Senate. The next chapter looks into the relations between the senator as an 
individual representative of the counties and the county governments. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Structuring Senator and County Government Relations 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A major source of conflicts between governors and the Senate members has been the extent 
of the latter’s involvement in county affairs. While the previous chapter provided a detailed 
analysis on the role of the Senate as an organ, this chapter is dedicated to examining how 
relations between the senator as an elected representative and the county governments may be 
structured in light of the Senate’s role. It especially examines the extent to which a senator 
may constitutionally participate in the affairs of the county and county government and how 
the representative role may be bolstered. 
 
The chapter argues that, in order to effectively promote the interests of counties and county 
governments, an implicit duty rests on senators to meaningfully engage with their respective 
county governments. It is also argued that the move to have senators as heads of development 
forums at the county level whose mandate is to approve, co-ordinate, supervise or otherwise 
implement county projects, infringes on the separation and division of powers and is thus 
unconstitutional. 
 
4.2 Representation of interests 
In a representative capacity, a senator has the duty to promote and protect the interests of 
his/her county and its county government. As seen in the previous chapter, the senator 
represents the county and, later sitting as the Senate, is under an obligation to protect two 
interests; those of the county and county government. The question is how can a senator best 
fulfil the representative role?  
 
Notably, although the Constitution states that the Senate represents counties, and is to protect 
the interests of counties and their governments (‘the what’), there is no provision for a 
mechanism through which senators can engage with the counties and their governments in 
order to effectively articulate their interests (‘the how’). This poses a threat to the quality of 
representation, especially given the already weak linkage to the devolved units, discussed in 
previous chapter. The question of linkage with devolved units formed the subject of debate 
during the constitutional review process. To mitigate the problem of linkage between the 
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second chamber and the devolved units, the CoE had recommended that senators be given 
‘rights of audience in their respective county assemblies without a right to vote’ and be 
required to furnish annual reports before the respective county assembly as a way of injecting 
a ‘reciprocal relationship of accountability’.275 This proposal, however, never saw the light of 
day. 
 
Despite the weak linkage between senators and the county governments, nothing in the 
Constitution stops Senators and county governments from ‘building bridges’ by establishing 
visible mechanisms of forging mutual working relations.
276
 Ghai and Bosire observe that 
‘consultations with the county government would be desirable if not essential’.277 Meaningful 
representation demands that a senator should have a way to ascertain the needs of those 
whom he or she represents in order to articulate or consider them in voting on matters 
concerning counties and county governments. For instance, a senator could meaningfully 
engage with the counties and county governments before initiating legislation on county 
matters, or before seeking to amend the laws touching on counties in order to gather views.  
The same case applies to other roles at the national level, including those relating to revenue 
sharing
278
and oversight of the national executive.  
 
Kirui and Murkomen suggest the establishment of a legislative mechanism through which 
senators are made accountable to the counties in the performance of their duties. The authors 
proposed that ‘senators should also hold consultative meetings with county residents through 
county hearings on issues that must be addressed in the Senate’.279 As part of the 
accountability mechanism, they also recommend that senators, ‘be made to address special 
sessions of county assemblies three times in a year and account to the county through the 
assembly, on what they have been doing in the Senate on behalf of their counties’.280 This 
appears to resonate with the CoE’s earlier recommendation mentioned above. 
It is however submitted here that requiring the Senate to account to the county assembly is 
not a viable option and the Constitution does not even anticipate such an accountability 
mechanism. It is sufficient that the Senate members remain ultimately accountable to the 
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electorate who may unseat them at the end of the electoral term for unsatisfactory 
performance or recall them from office earlier as provided by law, whichever comes first.  
 
Apart from the problem of weak linkages between the senators and the county governments 
and the absence of a representation mechanism, the representative role has been 
compromised in other ways. First, the fact that there is only one senate representative per 
county adds a twist to the relationship between senators and governors. Each is a directly 
elected representative of the county. This injects an element of rivalry as the ’who is the 
bigger boss’ syndrome takes centre stage. The Kenyan model in that sense creates fertile 
ground for competitive rather than co-operative relations. This becomes more acute if the 
governor and senator hail from differing political affiliations. A contrast would be made with 
say, the Federal Republic of Nigeria whereby the three senators in a State each represents a 
specific senatorial district, thus effectively dissolving an aspect of ‘territorialism’ and the 
ensuing rivalry.  
 
The second difficulty lies in the apparent conflict of interest in designating the Senate as the 
promoter and protector of county interests and their governments and at the same time 
requiring it to oversee financial management of county governments. It is in the interests of 
counties that county funds be expended prudently and that services be delivered effectively. 
Oversight, therefore, if appropriately conducted would be a way of securing county interests. 
However, the fact that the Senate, a body within the national government may summon 
governors to explain or justify their financial management creates a hierarchical structure 
between the two offices, introducing power relation issues which have partly led to the 
conflicts witnessed.  
 
4.3 Senator as executive? 
Laws have been enacted and others proposed which in effect make senators chairs of 
development forums at the county level; a situation that has met with resistance from 
governors. The latest arose from the County Governments (Amendment) Act, 2014, which 
established County Development Boards (CDBs) in every county, which are to be chaired by 
the elected senator.
281
 The governor is to be the Vice-chairman of the Board.
282
A senator is to 
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convene all CDB meetings that are to be held at the County level. The Board’s membership 
also extends to elected MPs within a county, leaders of the majority and minority parties in 
the county assembly, chairperson of the county assembly committee responsible for the 
budget, the county commissioner and the county secretary.
283
 The Act states that the main 
purpose of the CDBs is to provide a forum for consultation and coordination between the 
national government and the county governments on matters of development and projects.
284
 
CBDs are to consider and give input on county development plans and county budgets before 
they are tabled in the county assembly for consideration.  
 
The assent by the President of this law predictably faced stiff opposition from governors who 
dashed to the High Court to have the Act rendered unconstitutional.
285
 In the first CDB 
meeting convened by senators under the Act, the governors vowed to abstain from it, while 
others declined to provide meeting venues. Senators vowed to go ahead with the meeting 
anyway, before the High Court’s orders temporarily barred the impugned meeting from 
taking place. Senators defended the move to involve them in county forums claiming that its 
move is to streamline development and service delivery in the counties. Furthermore, that, as 
senators, they are best placed to chair the county boards, as they are the ‘umbilical cord 
linking National and County Governments’ and that the Senate is a more neutral organ since 
it does not run any funds.
286
 Governors are however particularly opposed to the idea of the 
senators chairing CBDs meant to deliberate county affairs;
287
 they are wary that this could be 
yet another move to undermine their authority as the heads of county governments. 
 
Apart from the CBDs, a senator is also part of the County Projects Committee (CPC) in each 
county in terms of Part VII of the Constituencies Development Fund Act, 2013
288
. A CPC 
comprises, among others, a senator, ‘the Members of Parliament from the County,’289 a 
county women representative and a national government official at the county.
290
 The CPC is 
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charged with implementing projects financed through the CDF,
291
 and may even make 
official or impromptu visits to projects if it finds it appropriate to do so.
292
 Glaringly and 
rather ironically, the composition largely excludes the executives of the counties. While 
county departmental heads under whose docket the various projects fall may attend CPC 
meetings as ex-officio members, they can only do so upon invitation by the CPC.
293
 
 
The Senator could chair yet another forum at the county level if the County Industrial 
Development Bill, 2014 proposing to introduce County Industrial Development Funds for the 
counties, goes through.
294
 If passed into law, the elected senator would chair the County 
Industrial Development Committee (CIDC) comprising, among others, nominated senators, 
all elected members of the National Assembly in the county and the governor or the deputy 
governor. The national government official responsible for the coordination of national 
government programmes in the county would also form part of this committee.
295
 The 
memorandum of objects and reasons, states that the aim of the Bill is to create a system 
through which the counties would be ‘encouraged and assisted to establish industries 
focusing, primarily on the produce of each county’. A rather far-reaching proposal in the Bill 
was the introduction of vetting for all projects, whether public or private, by the CIDC
296
 and 
provision for prior approval of the projects within the county by the CIDC.
297
 
 
The advent of the involvement of legislators in decentralised funds and development projects 
at the local level did not begin with the devolved system under the Constitution. There had 
been earlier forms of fiscal decentralisation efforts and schemes as mentioned in chapter two 
of the study. The Constituencies Development Fund Act, 2003 set up constituency funds to 
be primarily run by MPs.
298
 It would appear it is from this concept that the impugned Senate 
forums have been transplanted. Although a number of mostly developing countries have 
embraced the equivalent of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs),
299
 these have been met 
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with sharp criticisms in those countries.
300
 For Kenya, the effect of the parallel development 
mechanisms in the wake of a devolved system of governance becomes even more grievous 
for reasons explained below.  
 
4.4 Assessment 
The involvement of senators in forums at the county level squarely sets the senator and the 
county executives on a collision path. More importantly, the arrangement offends the 
Constitution in two major ways. First, it infringes on the principle of separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative powers.
301
 The principle of separation of powers is a 
foundational principle of the Constitution and one of the objects of devolution.
302
 As can be 
deciphered above, these development forums are not the ordinary meet-and-greet meetings, 
they are charged with the implementation and co-ordination of projects. In the case of CDF, 
there is specific fund allocation to be run, while the development forums are to be 
administered from the county’s share of revenue. The national legislator thus becomes an 
executor of policy at the county level.  
 
Secondly, such an arrangement offends the vertical division of powers between the national 
and county governments. The senator, as a national organ within the national government, 
effectively becomes part of the county government as s/he actively engages in policy 
direction and project co-ordination and implementation.  As seen earlier in Chapter Two on 
the functional division of powers in the devolved structures, matters of county planning is the 
preserve of the county executive, led by the governor. Similarly, oversight over the county 
development plans and budgets is vested on the county assembly. Thus, the involvement of 
senators in the county development and committees offends not only the separation of powers 
between the legislative and executive roles, but also the division of functions in the devolved 
structures, the core essence of devolution. Indeed, one of the demands for co-operative 
governance under Article 189 of the Constitution is that government at either level must 
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‘perform its functions and exercise its powers in a manner that respects the functional and 
institutional integrity of government at the other level’.303 
 
Furthermore, the enhancement of checks and balances, one of the objects of devolution
304
 is 
seriously put in jeopardy, as the senator charged with overseeing how the county spends 
money, is involved in giving inputs, and co-ordinating and overseeing how actual 
development takes place. This scenario creates a conflict of interest and could lead to the 
buck passing between the county executives and legislators when finally problems arise in 
connection with the use of the devolved funds - an interesting drama could even unfold where 
‘the hunter becomes the hunted.’ The argument that, allowing senators to chair the CBDs 
would enable them ‘to get useful information that they can use to facilitate their county 
oversight role’305 tends to overlook the inherent conflict of interest in such a proposition. It 
also insinuates that senators can be some sort of spies or undercover investigators, stealthily 
gathering information adverse to the county governments in those county forums, and then 
later conveniently extricating themselves to play the role of an independent overseer as a 
collective body in the Senate. 
 
While the development funds and development forums, prima facie, are well-meaning, their 
design and manner of implementation is wanting. As Ongoya and Lumallas point out in their 
critique of the then CDF Act, 2003, ‘[t]he problem with these developments is rarely found in 
the theoretical ideals, the challenge is usually with design and architecture’306. 
 
Senators have important roles to perform at the national level, not just over county matters, 
but also in oversight and legislative functions in national matters. They cannot effectively be 
legislators and at the same time implementers of policy decisions at the county and 
constituency levels. This is likely to compromise the core business of representing county 
interests. Besides, if there are gaps in, for example, planning, or a county is unable to perform 
its functions, there are constitutional mechanisms available for the national government to 
correct them. Senators have at their disposal tools of reining in the county governments to the 
allowable constitutional limits. For instance, sitting in the Senate, a senator can influence the 
                                                          
303
 Art 189(1)(a) Constitution. 
304
 Art 174(i) Constitution. 
305
 Murkomen K ‘Why there is nothing wrong with senators chairing county boards’ Friday Daily Nation online  
8 August 2014.  
306
 Ongoya & Lumallas (2005) para 3.0.  
 
 
 
 
64 
 
enactment or amendment to legislation that assists and strengthens the county governments to 
better perform their roles.
307
 The Senate also wields the oversight mandate over how counties 
spend money allocated to them from the national government. Moreover, if matters were to 
get out of hand, the senators later convening in the Senate ultimately play a vital role in the 
impeachment processes of the governor. Furthermore, the national government can also 
intervene in the event a county government is unable to perform its functions or does not 
comply with a system of financial management as set under the Constitution.
308
 Stoppage of 
funds is yet another option available to the national government in certain circumstances.
309
 
There is thus no rationale in ‘short-circuiting’ the mechanisms already set out in the law. It is 
premature and runs against the grain of constitutional and devolution principles.  
 
All types of elections in Kenya are conducted on the same day.
310
 The candidates and their 
respective political parties (including independent candidates) make up their mind which 
level of government they wish to serve; whether at the national or county level. The aspirants 
and their parties also make a conscious decision as to whether they wish to be legislators - in 
this case senators - or executives, as in the county governors. The terms of reference for each 
are distinct, just as is the pay check.
311
 Once elections are over and the newly elected 
representatives are sworn into office, there can be no apparent change or mix of roles until 
the end of the electoral cycle when parties can change candidature. One cannot have one title 
and be allowed to perform what is essentially the portfolio of another’s title. Each must stick 
to their constitutional mandate. Senators constitute an organ of the national government and 
have no executive role to play in the counties and should thus steer away from forums whose 
functions entail the co-ordination of, project approvals or actual implementation of county 
projects. Enhancing checks and balances and the separation of powers is one of the core 
objects of devolution and one that demands respect.
312
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4.5 Conclusion 
It is possible to foster harmonious and fruitful relations between the senator and county 
governments within the constitutionally allowable limits. In order to effectively discharge the 
representative role as a Senate, it is crucial that the individual senators find means of 
engaging with the county governments and counties in order to ascertain their interests. 
Without such a mechanism for collecting views, the representative role loses its practical 
meaning. Such means of engagement should however respect the principles of devolution and 
co-operative government, including the functional division of powers between the two levels 
of government. A senator has important roles to perform with respect to county governments 
- executive functions is however not one of them. Membership of senators to forums meant to 
deliberate, co-ordinate or implements the developmental agenda in counties, crosses the 
legislative and executive bounds and undermines the institutional autonomy of county 
governments. Such involvement also undesirably sets the stage for conflicts between senators 
and governors, which may otherwise be easily avoided.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya bestowed governance of the country to two levels of 
government; the county government and the national government. Article 186, as read with 
the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, provides for the functional competencies of each of 
the levels.
313
 None of the two levels is an agent of the other, and each exercises delegated 
authority derived directly from the people of Kenya. Furthermore, both levels of government 
derive their existence from the Constitution. Neither of the two levels is subordinate to the 
other. Nevertheless, though distinct, the two levels are interdependent and are required to 
conduct their mutual relations in consultation and co-operation with each other. 
 
The study was necessitated by the emerging relational conflicts between the Senate/senators-
representatives of the subnational governments and governors - the heads of county 
governments in Kenya’s multi-level governance. The Senate and governors belong to 
different levels of government. The rivalry between the two is peculiar, especially given that 
both the Senate and governors represent the interests of one subnational unit. These conflicts 
have escalated to the point that they threaten to shake the devolution structure to its core. The 
study thus sought to explore the constitutional architecture as well as the legal framework 
governing the powers of the Senate and county governments in Kenya. The research also set 
out to establish the practice surrounding the relations between governors and the Senate. 
Lastly, the study looked at ways of avoiding the conflicts. The key findings and lessons from 
the research study are summarised in the various subheadings below. 
 
Constitutional status 
The study established that the Senate is a legislative body within the national government and 
is one of the two Houses forming the bicameral legislature in Kenya.  The Senate represents 
the counties. Members of the Senate are popularly elected by the registered voters of the 47 
counties in a general election that is conducted the same day as that for the Governor and the 
President. The introduction of the 20 nominated senators comprising women representatives, 
the youth and persons with disabilities is meant to cater for special interests. The composition 
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of the Senate, and the equality of voting in the House, is vital to ensuring that there is equality 
in representation even for the least populous counties. It further underscores the core role of 
the Senate as the protector and promoter of county interests.  
 
The governors, on the other hand, are the heads of the executive arm of the county 
government and, together with the deputy governor and CEC members, form the executive 
authority of the county governments. Just like the senators, the 47 governors are popularly 
elected by county voters during a general election. A discussion of the status of the county 
assembly, the legislative arm of the county governments, was necessary because the oversight 
role of the Senate has impacts the county assembly and vice versa. The county assembly, it 
was established, is designated not just as the legislative arm of the county governments, but 
also as an oversight body over the county executive. 
 
Role sharing 
The respective functions of the Senate and governors are laid out under the Constitution and 
law. The Senate is designated as the ‘promoter’ and ‘protector’ of the interests of the counties 
and county governments. Notably, the Constitution puts a lot of faith in the Senate, banking 
on the institution to play the role of a zealous protector of interests of both counties and their 
governments. It is for this reason that it exonerates the House from much of the national 
business so that it can amply attend to this core mandate. Besides the representative role, the 
study established that the Senate exercises supervisory authority by way of impeachment 
processes and oversight over county finances. This, the study noted, has brought about its 
own dynamics - It has effectively skewed power relations between the Senate and county 
governments. This power relations syndrome has tended to have a spill-over effect in 
relations between senators and governors, where the senator is accorded a ‘higher status’, 
being designated as chair of development forums. This scenario invites rivalry and power 
struggles between the two entities.  
 
Governors, on the other hand, are designated as the chief executives of the respective county 
governments and it is on them that the executive authority of county governments ultimately 
rests. As such, the study concludes that there is no role confusion on the respective roles of 
the Senate and governors. Even so, the study uncovered inherent weaknesses in the design of 
the role of the Senate vis-à-vis the county governments as encapsulated below. 
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The Senate’s representative role 
There are various avenues through which the Senate can serve to promote and protect the 
interests of county governments. Through legislation, the Senate can actively initiate, 
consider and approve Bills affecting counties. In its reactive role, the Senate has a duty to 
stop laws that are ‘anti-county’ interests from passing, or allowing for more considered and 
better versions of laws through delays. In revenue matters, the Senate occupies a vantage 
point in the vertical and horizontal sharing of national revenue. Through its participation in 
the revenue processes, the Senate can ensure the protection of county governments’ interests. 
Additionally, the Senate may counteract executive decisions that are adverse to the interests 
of county governments through its oversight role at the national level. By exercising review 
power over national government intervention and participation in constitutional amendment 
processes, the Senate is able to act as a bulwark against unwarranted intrusion in the county 
government structures and their affairs. 
 
The study established that the Senate’s representative role has been weakened, owing to some 
aspects in the design of the Constitution. Three challenges were identified with regard to this 
role. First, it was discovered that the mode of selection of the Kenyan senators effectively 
compromises on the representative role of the county governments. While according the 
Senate political muscle at the national level, popular election of senators by the county 
electorate, portends weak links to the county governments. It was argued that such a situation 
also attracted competitive, as opposed to co-operative, relations and may partly be to blame 
for the antagonistic relations between county governments and senators. The situation is 
likely to be even more precarious if the governor and senator hail from different ‘warring’ 
parties, which further weakens the strength of representation due to the influence of party 
politics. A caveat was however raised in that the delegate system as is the case with the South 
African or German systems may not always yield stronger representation of the subnational 
governments in practice, due to the influence of party politics.  
 
The second problem lies with the fact that both the senator and the governor derive their 
mandate from one territorial unit - the county. This created an ideal environment for rivalry 
between the two elected representatives.  In addition, it was noted that the fact that all the 
elections in Kenya are conducted on the same day meant that the election of senators was 
very much influenced by the political mood of the day. This meant that the political genetic 
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makeup mirrored that of the National Assembly. This could also weaken the counteracting 
force of the Senate on county affairs at the national level.  
 
The third structural weakness appertaining to the representational role was the absence of a 
representational mechanism between senators and county governments. A representation 
mechanism is especially important, given the already weak bondage of senators to the county 
governments. 
The study established that, as a result of the foregoing weaknesses and fuelled by exogenous 
factors such as politics, the representational role has been severely compromised. 
 
Despite these difficulties, the representative role could still be strengthened. For instance, the 
study noted that although the Constitution does not expressly demand that senators consult 
the county governments, there is nothing in the Constitution stopping the senators and county 
governments from setting up a liaison so as to give meaning to the representational role. 
Indeed, it was argued, an implicit duty lies on the part of the senators to ascertain the interests 
of the county governments in order to be able to articulate them at the national level. Without 
such systems in place, the role would become more a theoretical than a practical one.  
 
Thus, in order to mitigate the effect of the weak linkage of the senators to the county 
governments, the study proposes the following measure: that, as a matter of practice, the 
senators, with their respective county governments, come up with mutually agreeable 
mechanisms of engagement with the aim of eliciting the concerns and needs of county 
governments. These mechanisms can be informal and develop as a matter of practice and 
need not be legislated upon. What is paramount is that such engagement mechanisms be 
effective for the purpose and also abide by the devolution principles, including respect for the 
autonomy of county governments and the division of powers between the levels of 
government. 
 
Oversight over county finances 
Despite its perceived gains and noble intentions, the study established that the oversight role 
has been very contentious and a major source of conflict in practice. The key issue here is to 
what extent the Senate can lawfully exercise its financial oversight mandate over county 
finances in light of the county assembly’s role.  
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The study established that the design of the oversight mandate is partly to blame for the 
conflicts pitting the parties against each other for the following three reasons. First, the 
Constitution gives the power of financial oversight to two bodies in different spheres of 
government. Vesting the Senate, an organ in the national government, the oversight mandate, 
effectively introduces hierarchical power relations between the Senate and the governors, 
hence the rivalry. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the supervisory role accorded the Senate over 
county governments is being mirrored in protocol and the senator’s engagement with the 
counties, with the senator being accorded a ‘higher’ status to that of the governor. Secondly, 
there is ambiguity in law as to the extent to which the Senate exercises its oversight mandate. 
This is made worse by the fact that the Senate, unlike county assemblies, lacks effective tools 
of oversight. Thirdly is the question of power overlap between the Senate and the county 
assemblies in terms of oversight over counties. The Constitution and the law are unclear as to 
what extent the Senate’s oversight role is to be exercised in view of the county assembly’s 
powers. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Senate and county assemblies, for instance, 
have already begun bickering over who has the mandate to probe the reports of the Auditor 
General that relate to county governments. 
 
The Kenyan courts have set forth useful principles to govern the exercise of the oversight role 
by the Senate.
314
 To ensure that the oversight role has meaning, and in order to avoid 
conflicts, it is proposed that, first the oversight mandate of the Senate be broadly interpreted. 
In other words, the oversight mandate under Article 96(3) of the Constitution should not only 
be seen or read in the restricted sense of summoning governors to account before the Senate 
Committee and interrogating the minutiae of the reports touching on county government 
affairs. Thus, and without destroying its constitutionally vested oversight power, the Senate’s 
oversight is confined to an aggregate level, leaving the details of individual county 
government finances to the county assemblies on whom the primary duty rests. That way, the 
oversight role would reinforce the representative role of the Senate rather than, ‘taking away 
from it, by the other hand’. 
 
The second option is to amend the Constitution and completely divest the Senate of the 
oversight mandate, leaving everything to the county governments. Such an option however, 
                                                          
314
 Refer to International Legal Consultancy & JSC case above. 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
the study noted, is most unlikely, given that it would require the approval of a two thirds 
majority from the Senate in order to pass. 
 
Impeachment procedures 
The impeachment procedure has, and understandably so, been an overly emotive subject that 
has stirred up sour relations between senators and governors on the one part and governors 
and MCAs on the other; understandably emotive, as the process could have deep 
repercussions - it means someone losing their job and the initial will of the electorate being 
put to the test. The study revealed that similar to the oversight role, impeachment procedures 
are susceptible to manipulation to advance selfish political interests. Indeed, the manner and 
circumstances surrounding most impeachment processes so far point more towards politically 
instigated impeachment processes, clothed in legal attire as genuine exercise of a 
constitutional mandate. It was noted that impeachment is a double-edged sword, which could 
be inappropriately used to intimidate county executives and kill devolution, rather than a tool 
to genuinely weed out non-performing executives.  
 
It was noted that the process has been grossly abused by the MCAs for selfish gain and to 
settle scores, a situation that has led to stand offs in some county governments, thus 
compromising on the functioning of county governments as mandated under the Constitution. 
This state of affairs has left the executives vulnerable and open to blackmail and this has the 
effect of compromising the independence of the executives. In such an environment, the 
executives may not make ‘bold’ decisions for fear of either having their work frustrated by 
failure by MCAs to approve the executive plans or the ultimate fate - being impeached at 
whim. This state of affairs effectively curtails development and service delivery which are at 
the heart of devolution It was further discovered that, in most instances, the rules of the 
respective assemblies have not been adhered to, thus denying the executives due process. The 
Senate occupies a vantage point as the second port of call and in exercise of its oversight and 
review powers to ensure that the procedures are well complied with. However, the study 
discovered that the Senate has often deferred to the county assembly processes, hence is 
unhelpful in reining on this process, especially considering that the Senate is not itself 
impervious to partisan interests.  
 
An analysis of the practice surrounding impeachment processes thus revealed that the 
influence of politics and selfish interests cannot be wished away. In view of this reality, it is 
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unsafe to leave such a sensitive process entirely at the mercy of such a politically charged 
climate. It obviously becomes even more difficult, if not impossible, to legislate or otherwise 
guard against the effects of politics and maliciously instigated processes. In light of this, it is 
suggested that a more stringent process of impeaching governors and their deputies, which is 
not confined to the two assemblies be introduced. In order to restore ‘sanity’ in the 
impeachment processes and especially in light of politics, it behoves having a neutral arbiter 
in order to inject fairness and dilute the effect of politics and other selfish interests. The 
importance of the Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction in impeachment processes cannot, 
therefore, be gainsaid. The Kenyan courts have laid important principles to govern 
impeachment procedures.
315
 Involving a neutral party such as the courts in the process would 
ensure that the sanctity of the process is not sacrificed to party politics and selfish interests. 
Even then, it is advisable that the process providing for court intervention should cap the 
level at which an appeal can be made against the decision of the first instance. This is to 
guard against the effects of protracted court processes that ultimately are counterproductive to 
performance and county interests. It will also ensure that the process is not used to unduly 
prolong or merely ‘procrastinate’ the ultimate fate of deserving, non-performing executives. 
 
In view of the vulnerability of the impeachment processes, the current state of affairs, 
whereby the procedural aspects are governed by erratic rules of the respective assemblies, is 
detrimental. Therefore, the study roots for a constitutionally entrenched process in order to 
ensure predictability and uniform application, while sealing loopholes for possible abuse. 
 
Involvement of senators in development forums  
What is the acceptable level of involvement of senators in county affairs? How can the 
relationship between the senators and county governments be strengthened? Chapter Four of 
the study probed these questions and came up with the following findings. 
 
While the idea behind the developmental efforts is prima facie noble, the study established 
that development forums in which senators are involved and even designated to convene and 
chair meetings is inappropriate in the current constitutional dispensation for various reasons. 
First, such an arrangement infringes on the vertical division of powers between the national 
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and county governments and undermines the autonomy of county governments as a distinct 
level of government. Secondly, such forums offend the separation of powers by conflating 
the legislative and executive functions.
316
 Senators as legislators and initiators of policy ought 
not be involved in execution. Other problems brought about by such arrangements include a 
compromise on accountability mechanisms. Such a state of affairs also dangerously courts 
conflict of interest with the senator as implementer of county projects and subsequently the 
Senate as overseer of how a county government expends national allocations on county 
projects. Moreover, such forums duplicate existing structures and unduly add to 
administration costs. In their current form and design, such funds and development forums 
are, therefore, an affront to key national values and principles under Article 10 of the 
Constitution, including good governance, accountability and the prudent utilisation of public 
resources. The study inevitably concludes that county development Boards chaired by the 
senator in their current form are unconstitutional. 
 
It is proposed that the existing parallel forums be scrapped. Any development initiatives 
must, as a rule of thumb, both in their design and implementation, be wholly weaved into the 
constitutionally recognised governance structures and not run parallel them. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
While tensions are not unheard of in multi-level systems of governance, if uncontrolled, they 
are likely to spill over and threaten the devolved structure, as the Kenyan experience shows. 
Some measurable progress has been made in the implementation of Kenya’s devolved 
system. However, the spirited rivalries being witnessed are a sure way of regressing on the 
gains made so far and a sure recipe to kill devolution.  
 
Undoubtedly, as the study has established, some aspects of the constitutional design are to 
blame for this wave of conflict and role confusion. Notwithstanding, most, if not all of the 
emerging conflicts witnessed between the county executives and the Senate after the 4 March 
2013 General Elections in Kenya could easily be avoided. It is possible for the two levels of 
government and institutions within them to work harmoniously with the Constitution as it is 
and avoid conflicts. Even where conflicts emerge, the nature of the co-operative relationship 
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between the levels of government demands that these must be resolved amicably. 
Importantly, this also requires a change of mind-set from the old centralist ways of doing 
things to the new system of governance, whereby power is shared out among the two levels 
of government and the organs within them. Otherwise, it will be akin to putting new wine 
into old wineskins which cannot hold.
317
  
 
The Kenyan Constitution came about as a result of many sacrifices and ‘[if] properly 
implemented carries great promise for the people of Kenya, and it offers the country a chance 
to transform society for all citizens.’318 The counties are the major manifestation of the 
country’s devolved governance and it is imperative therefore, that they deliver on the 
devolution promise. This requires co-operative as opposed to competitive interactions within 
and across the two levels of government. At the end of the day, development is local and 
every citizen belongs to a particular county. Thus, there is ultimately one client to serve, the 
Kenyan citizen, whose primary or sole concern is that quality services are efficiently 
delivered to them and that their livelihood is improved through development. Success of the 
county governments will ultimately reflect on the Government of the Republic as a whole and 
vice versa, with the biggest winner or loser, as the case may be, being the mwananchi.
319
 
Rivalry stunts are therefore unentertaining theatrics to the ordinary person, are misplaced and 
an unnecessary derailment to the devolution process. 
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